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ABSTRACT

SEC REGULATION OF CORPORATE 10K FILING DATES:
THE EFFECT ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND MARKET RECOGNITION
Robert W. Russ, CPA
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2005
Director: Dr. Ruth W. Epps
Professor and Chairman
Department of Accounting

In November 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission released a final
ruling regarding a filing requirement change. The proposed requirement change was for
domestic companies to file annual and quarterly reports within 60 and 30 days,
respectfully. This requirement was recommended for companies with a market value of
at least $75 million and would reduce by 30 days the time allowed to file these reports.

The Wall Street Journal article announcing this proposal stated the change was an effort
to address some of the problems arising from accounting scandals such as the Enron
scandal of 2001. A potential added benefit of the SEC rule change might be a reduction
in earnings management.

The purpose of this study is two fold. The first part is to test the theory that
earnings management takes time. The second purpose is to examine the question of
market recognition of earnings management. Sloan (1996) and other researchers report
that the market does not recognize earnings management in the long term. Xie's (2001)
results suggest that the market over prices earnings management. Balsam et al. (2002)
found the market reacted negatively to abnormal accruals. The current research study
uses a larger sample including firms not suspected of earnings management and fails to
confirm the Balsam et al. result. The findings of the current study suggest that the results
of the Balsam et al. study are either the result of the data selection process used in that
study or the data selection process used by Balsam et al. controlled for other market
fluctuations not included in the current study.
The results of this study suggest a positive relationship between earnings
management and the time to file annual reports. This finding supports for the theory that
moving earnings fiom a future period to the current period requires time. Thus, the SEC
rule change to reduce the time to file annual reports sliould reduce a company's ability to
manipulate earnings.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In November 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission released a final
ruling regarding a filing requirement change. The requirement change is for domestic
companies to file annual and quarterly reports within 60 and 30 days of the end of the
period, respectively. This requirement is recommended for companies with a market
value of at least $75 million. The proposed change reduces by 30 days the time allowed
to file these reports and will be phased in between 2003 and 2006.
The official SEC release states that annual reports contain significant information
used by stakeholders in their investing and voting decisions, and more timely
presentation of this information to the public would be beneficial (SEC 2002). The
official SEC release is supported by prior research which found significant market
reaction to 10K filings (Asthma and Balsam 2001; Griffin 2003). The prior research has
found that the market reacts to annual report filings (Asthana et al. 2001) and in the case
of late annual filings, the market reacts negatively (Griffin 2003). The conclusion of both
of these studies is that information contained in the annual report filings is value relevant.
Griffin (2003) further concludes that the timeliness of the annual reports is value relevant.
Prior research on the timeliness of annual report filings reveals several issues.
Alford et al. (1994) found firms that are late filing 10K's are generally small andlor
financially troubled. Typically, these firms are also experiencing negative market

adjusted stock returns. To reduce these negative stock returns, management could be
motivated to manipulate the financial results of the company. Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997; 1998) found that management has incentives to manage earnings to avoid earnings
fluctuations.
Givoly and Palmon (1982) study the timeliness of annual report filings, concluded
that over the period of 1960 to 1974, companies have shortened the number of days from
an average of 63 days to an average 4 1 days to file reports. Defining bad news as
earnings less than expected, they also found bad news reporting was delayed and the
market reaction to the bad news was reduced by the duration of the delay. They
speculate that information from other sources preempts the stock market reaction to the
late earnings announcement. Givoly and Palmon (1982) also found that the timelines of
the annual filings was more related to intra-industry patterns and company traditions than
company attributes. This lead Givoly and Palmon to conclude that management has
discretion over the time of the filing.
Earnings management research has presented evidence that when management is
motivated and has the means to manipulate earnings, management manipulates earnings
to reach company goals. Trueman (1990) theorized that earnings management takes time
and proposed two possible explanations. One possibility is that management attempts to
move earnings between periods and this effort takes time. The second possibility is that
management waits for the results of other firms in the industry to announce earnings and
then adjusts their earnings to match industry results. For example, Chai and Tung (2002)
found that companies engaging in earnings management release earnings announcements

later than companies that do not engage in earnings management. The SEC rule change
could have the benefit of reducing company ability to manipulate earnings.
Earnings management research investigates relationships/events that may give
rise to management's manipulation of earnings. In a survey of the earnings management
literature, Healy and Wahlen (1999) conclude that researchers have been successful in
finding occasions where earnings management is present, but no research has examined
how regulators might control or limit earnings management. The current study starts the
process of identifying methods for regulators to limit earnings management.
Lynn Turner, past chief accountant at the SEC (Turner and Godwin 1999), called
for more academic research to assist the SEC in identifying methods to reduce earnings
management. The current research examines the impact of how regulators might limit
earnings management by limiting the amount of time that is allowed to prepare and
present annual financial information to investors.
To extend the earnings management literature to identifying a potential control for
earnings management, the purpose of this research project is to test the theory that
earnings management takes time. Trueman (1990) stated that either time is required to
move earnings from one period to another or that companies wait to see results from
competitors before making their own earnings management decisions as two possible
reasons for delays in reporting caused by earnings management. Regardless of which
factor (time to move earnings, or waiting to know the industry results) actually causes the
delay, the SEC change in time to file reports will reduce the time available to file reports
and might also limit their ability to manipulate earnings.

Specifically, this study uses a large sample of annual report filings and
simultaneous equations to investigate if earnings management requires additional time in
relationship to annual report filings. A sample of annual report filings from 1992 to 2003
is used. The companies included in the current study are non-financial, non-utility,
domestic f m s that have five or more years of annual filings in the EDGAR database
with corresponding financial data available from Compustat. This study tests for a
relationship between abnormal accruals (earnings management) and the timeliness of
annual report filing. Findings of the current study that support the relationship between
earnings management and reporting timeliness provide evidence that the SEC rule change
can have the additional benefit of reducing earnings management.
Earnings management for the current study is measured by calculating abnormal
accruals using the cash flow variant of the modified Jones model (Hribar et al. 2002).
Timeliness is measured by the number of days between the company fiscal yearend and
the date the annual 1OK report is filed with the SEC.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter
reviews previous research on the timeliness of corporate reporting and earnings
management. The model, hypotheses, and methodology are developed in chapter 111.
Chapter IV presents the results and Chapter V provides a summary, conclusion,
limitations, and recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER I1
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The purpose of this study is to test the relationship between earnings management
and the timeliness of annual report filings. A significant relationship between earnings
management and the timeliness of filings provides support for the theory that earnings
management requires time (Trueman 1990). Finding support for this theory may indicate
that the SEC rule change, reducing the time to file annual reports, may also reduce a
company's ability to manipulate earnings.
Testing the relationship between earnings management and the timeliness of
annual report filings generates two objectives for this study. One is a research question
of testing the theory that earnings management takes time by testing the timeliness of
annual report filings. The second objective is to answer the following research question:
Does the market recognize earnings management?
Two major areas of literature are relevant to this study: Timeliness of corporate
reporting in relationship to earnings management, and earnings management as it relates
to market reaction. The research on reporting timeliness has produced literature
regarding issues that affect the timeliness of earnings announcements and corporate
report filings. The literature on earnings management has produced a wealth of literature
indicating that there is incentive to manipulate earnings and where the incentive exists,

earnings management exists. Research on market recognition of earnings management
has produced a small quantity of published studies in which all but one of these studies
indicate that the market does not recognize earnings management.
In the section on timeliness, a review of the literature relating to when companies
announce earnings andlor file statutory reports. The research on timeliness indicates that
companies file reports/announce earnings at traditional time intervals. The literature also
provides characteristics associated with reportinglannouncement delays. Trueman's
theory states that earnings management requires time, therefore companies that are
engaging in earnings management should have delayed reportingJfilings. Trueman's
theory is supported by the work of Chai and Tung (2002) who found earnings
management present in late announcing firms. The characteristics associated with late
reporting/announcements are used as control variables in the current study. The
timeliness of reporting section concludes with a summary of the selected literature
regarding the market reaction to reporting/announcement timeliness.
The earnings management section presents a review of the literature which
examines management incentive and opportunity to manage earnings. This review
provides evidence that management engages in earnings management when motivation is
sufficient. This section also provides control variables needed for the earnings
management model used in the study. The earnings management section concludes with
a review of the literature which examines market reaction to earnings management. The
literature examining the market reaction to earnings management has mixed results.
Some literature finds the market does not recognize earnings management. And one

study that finds, at least in the short term, which the market does react to earnings
management present in financial reports. The earnings management section also includes
a section on the evolution of the measurement of abnormal accruals, used in the literature
to measure earnings management.

Timeliness of Corporate Reporting
In an early study of timeliness of filings, Dyer and McHugh (1975) tested the
attributes of 120 Australian companies from 1965 to 1971. The primary purpose of the
research was to establish the impact of corporate attributes on corporate filing timeliness.
Dyer and McHugh (1975) found that larger companies (above $50M in total assets)
reported sooner than smaller companies (less than $5M in total assets), The
characteristics found to be significant were corporate size and company year-end.
Whittred (1 980b) replicated the Dyer and McHugh study using a random sample
of 100 Australian firms from 1972 to 1977. The purpose of the replication was to test the
effect of a new listing requirement by the Australian Associated Stock Exchanges. The
listing requirement change was a reduction in the time allowed for companies to file their
annual reports. The results of the Whittred study indicate that the change in requirement
had no effect on the timeliness of corporate reporting. The companies that were able to
file before the four month requirement were already filing before that date and the firms
that failed to file timely before the reduced reporting requirement also failed to file timely
after the reduced time period requirement was implemented.

Using the same 100 Australian companies from the Whittred study, Davies and
Whittred (1980) study research further examine company attributes that might help
explain the reporting delay reported in the Dyer and McHugh (1975) study. Davies and
Whittred ranked all companies in the sample and used quartiles to determine large and
small companies. The results revealed that both the small and large firms (first and
fourth quartiles) reported sooner than the moderate size firms (second and third
quartiles). Further, Davies and Whittred tested auditor attributes for their effect on delay.
While the testing found no association between then Big 8 audit firms and other audit
firms, there was an association between a change in auditors and reporting delay. In
contrast to Dyer and McHugh, Davies and Whittred did not find firm yearend or
profitability to be significant. They did find that companies experiencing extremes in
profitability experienced reporting delays.
Zeghal(1984) tested the usefulness of accounting information in relation to the
timeliness of that information. Using the announcement of financial statement
publication for 1400 firms between 1973 and 1975, Zeghal tested the market reaction to
the financial statement announcements. The results of this study showed that information
presented earlier to financial statement users earlier has more relevance (greater market
reaction). Zeghal found the relevance of the information was greater for interim
statements than for annual reports. He suggested that the information in the annual report
was anticipated more than the information contained in the interim statements and the
market had already reacted to the information contained in the annual report, making the

annual report a confirmatory process. The lower reaction to annual reports could be
related to the time required to distribute the annual reports.
Alford et al. (1994) examined firms that file SEC form 10K after the statutory
filing period of 90 days. Using a sample of 38,775 10K filings from 7,887 firms between
1978 and 1985, the authors found that 20 percent of firms missed the statutory filing date.
Further examination revealed common characteristics for late filers. In particular, late
filers are not random but are generally small, have negative earnings changes, low
liquidity, high leverage, and experience negative market reactions. The majority of these
firms also have experienced an unfavorable economic event. Fifty percent of the late
filers in their sample indicated the reason for late filing was due to debt renegotiation or
financial distress.
Givoly and Palmon (1982) examined earnings announcements and found a
significant but weak relationships with bad news delays. The authors used a sample of
2,836 earnings announcements collected from The Wall Street Journal Index for the years
1960 to 1974. Their results reveal a steady decline in reporting delay over the time
period. The purpose of their study was to find common firm characteristics related to the
observed timeliness of earnings announcements. Givoly and Palmon found that company
size and complexity of the audit were associated with the timeliness of earnings
announcements. Company size was inversely related to the timeliness of filing1;larger
companies report earlier than small companies. The authors used a ratio of inventory to
total assets as a proxy for complexity.

Keller (1986) hypothesized that qualified audit opinions would cause a delay in
earnings announcements and report filings. Using a sample of firms from 1973 to 1977
Keller found a delay in announcement and filings by firms that were given subject to
audit opinions by their auditors. Keller also found that the correct event date for studying
audit delay was not the earnings announcement date but the annual report date.
Similarly, Whittred (1 980a) collected a random sample of 100 companies financial
statements between 1965 and 1974 and discovered that qualified audit opinions would
lead to a delay in the annual report filing. Indeed, for Australian companies, qualified
audit opinions had a significant effect on the timeliness of annual reports.
Because audit delay can affect reporting delay, Dyer and McHugh (1975)
examined audit signatures as a source of delay in financial reporting. Their results
suggest that the timing of audit signatures was stationary over time, having an effect on
the time of the filing, but not an effect on early or late filing. Ashton et al. (1989)
examined audit delay in more detail because audit delay can affect reporting delay. The
authors used a sample of 842 Canadian firms that traded on the Toronto exchange.
Ashton et al. found that companies reporting net losses and extraordinary items had
greater audit delays. Companies with December and January yearends had fewer audit
delays. While the results were significant, they explained very little of the variation in
reporting timeliness. Intra-industry patterns explained more variability in reporting delay
than individual company characteristics.

'

Timeliness of filing was defined in Givoly and Palmon (1982) as the number of days between the
company year end and the filing date.

Extending the audit delay research, Barnber et al. (1993) studied audit factors that
influence audit reporting delay. The authors hypothesized that the extent of audit work,
audit firm technology, and auditor incentives to expend more time were determinants of
audit reporting lag. Using a sample of 972 firm years between 1983 and 1985, the
authors found that auditor business risk (proxied by concentration of ownership and
financial condition), audit complexity (proxied by industry), company size, and other
factors (extraordinary items, net losses, and qualified opinions) were all significant
factors in explaining audit delay.
Other research has examined the release date of earnings information. The extant
research in this area suggests that companies with bad news tend to release information
later, and that companies with good news tend to release information earlier (Chambers
and Penman 1984). Chambers and Penman (1984) used a random sample of 100 firms
listed on the New York Stock Exchange; collected annual dates from The Wall Street
Journal Index, and obtained a sample of 2,756 firm-years from 1970 to 1976. These
authors found an inverse relationship between size and announcement timing (large firms
announce earlier). Chambers and Penman also found early reports generally reflect good
news while later reports reflect bad news.
In extending this concept to 10K, filings Easton and Zmijewski (1993) used a
sample of 76,866 1OK filings and 193,283 10-Q filings from 1962 to 1985. The authors
found that the good news, (bad news) issue did not affect annual filings. The good news,
bad news was found to be an issue with earnings announcements but not in annual filings.

Courtis (1976) used a sample of 204 New Zealand firms and found results
comparable to Chambers and Penman (1984). Courtis found some industry variation in
the timeliness of filings. Also, early and late reporting firms had statistically significant
differences in profitability.
Chai and Tung (2002) examined earnings announcement timing and earnings
management. Using a sample of 10,503 firm year observations, Chai and Tung report
that discretionary accruals were influenced by late announcements. They defined late
announcements as earnings announcements that were made more than five days later than
the prior year. Further, the magnitude of discretionary accruals was also associated with
the magnitude of the delay in making the earnings announcement.
Bankruptcy issues have also been associated with reporting delays. Whittred and
Zimmer (1984) reported that Australian companies approaching bankruptcy had
significant reporting delays for three years prior to a company filing bankruptcy. Their
sample consisted of 53 failed firms between 1964 and 1978. Lawrence (1983) used a
sample of 110 firms that filed bankruptcy between 1975 and 1981 and also found
significant reporting delays for those companies filing bankruptcy.

Market Reaction to Earnings Management Literature
A large volume of literature has examined market reaction to various
characteristics of earnings announcements/report filings. The following section reviews
the literature regarding the market reaction to the timeliness of announcement/filing
dates. Research has addressed other issues that theoretically affect market reaction to
earnings announcements. Included in this research is the issue of the timing of earnings

announcements. Kross and Schroeder (1984), using sample consisted of 3,552 quarterly
observations from 1977 to 1980. Kross and Schroeder hypothesize a relationship
between type of news (good news vs. bad news) and the timing of the earnings
announcement. They fbrther hypothesize a relationship between the market reaction and
the timeliness of the earnings announcement. The abnormal return reaction was
significantly greater (lower) for firms that announced earlier (later). In the study, the
authors divided the sample of firms into three groups: those that announce early, those
that announce on-time, and those that announce late. Correlating these sub-samples to
bad news vs. good news resulted in six groups. Controlling for earnings forecast error,
they tested the abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date. The data used in
the study included quarterly and annual earnings announcements. To control for the
variation between quarterly announcements and annual announcements, the authors used
the number of days between the announcement date and the period end date in their time
series analysis. The median date for each firm was used to compute the early (late)
timing. The market reaction, after controlling for earnings forecast error, was the same
for all firms regardless of firm size, whether the firm reported good (bad) news, used
annual vs. quarterly announcement, or contained moderately good (bad) news.
Zeghal(1984) used a sample of quarterly and annual earnings announcements for
1,402 companies between 1973 and 1975. The results indicate that earlier information
has greater usefulness to stakeholders. Usefulness was estimated by calculating abnormal
returns associated with the earnings announcement dates.

Atiase et al. (1989), using a sample of 8,320 annual earnings announcements
between 1975 and 1984, found that large firms tend to announce their earnings earlier
than small firms and the market reaction was less for the large firms. The authors
hypothesized a relationship between the timeliness of the earnings announcement and the
market reaction to the announcement. Controlling for firm size, the length of
announcement delay was inversely related to the size of the market reaction.
In a theoretical paper, Gennotte and Trueman (1 996) researched the timing of
disclosures in more detail by researching the time of day the disclosure was made and the
subsequent market reaction. The authors conclude that there should be a greater market
reaction for disclosures made during the trading day than for disclosures made after the
market has closed.
Penman (1984) found that investment strategies using the announcement dates of
firms could produce abnormal returns to investors. Penman used a sample of 2,327
annual and quarterly earnings announcements to test the hypothesis that an investment
strategy based upon the earnings release timing could result in abnormal returns. The
results indicate that short positions taken on companies reporting late experienced
abnormal returns. The abnormal returns were larger for small firms and greater abnormal
returns were experienced for longer delays. Additionally, the research indicates that long
positions taken prior to an early announcement would also have produced abnormal
returns.
Sinclair and Young (1991) also found that abnormal returns could be obtained by
using an investment strategy based upon the timing of the earnings announcement.

Sinclair and Young used a sample of 1,110 half yearly earnings announcements between
1982 and 1988 for Australian firms. The authors hypothesized that results found by US
researchers would be the same using Australian firms. They found that while the reaction
was slightly less than the reactions reported in US firms, they did find that firms that
report early generally have good news to report, and that abnorn~alreturns around the
announcement date were associated with unexpected changes in earnings per share.
However, Sinclair and Young found no evidence of market reaction to timeliness of
reporting as reported by Kross and Schroeder (1984) when controlling for the information
content of the earnings announcement.
Chambers and Penman (1984) used a sample of 2,756 annual and quarterly
earnings announcements over the period of 1970 to 1976. Their findings show an inverse
relationship between size and announcement timing (large firms announce earlier), and
smaller firms have a greater market reaction to earnings announcements. Chambers and
Penman also found that early announcements generally indicate good news and late
announcements generally report bad news. The market also reacts negatively to late
announcements before the reports are issued. Chambers and Penman theorize that the
market was anticipating bad news.
Givoly and Palmon (1 982) in their study of earnings announcements found that
bad news delays were significant but the relationship was not a strong one. They used a
sample of 2,836 firm years between 1960 and 1974 to test trends and attributes of
companies that could affect the timeliness of company filings. The market reaction to the
later announcements was very small. The conclusion was that the longer the delay in

making earnings announcements the more information is obtained from other sources and
integrated into stock prices before the announcement date.
Easton and Zmijewski (1993) used a sample of 76,866 lOK reports and 193,283
10-Q reports from 1962 to 1985. They researched 10K and 10-Q filings, prior to
EDGAR, and found that firms did not delay bad news or present good news early in
annual or quarterly filings as found by Chambers and Penman (1984). Easton and
Zmijewski state that most reports were filed close to the filing deadline and left no room
for delay. They conclude that the timing issue described by Chambers and Penman must
be limited to earnings announcements.
Asthana and Balsam (200 1) examined the effect of the SEC website EDGAR on
information distribution. Using a sample of 195 randomly selected firms, they collected
filing dates from 1993 to 1997. Prior to EDGAR, market reaction to annual report filings
was not possible because the distribution of data required such a long period that it
permitted many other events to pollute the results. Using a sample of firms that are first
time filers on EDGAR, Asthana and Balsam found both a volume and price reaction to
1OK's filed on EDGAR and consistent with prior literature, there was no reaction to
filings made before EDGAR.
Griffin (2003), using a sample of 10,805 10K filings and 52,262 10-Q filings,
examined market reactions to corporate filings on the SEC EDGAR website. His results
indicate that the market reacts to quarterly and annual filings. Firms with large
institutional investor holdings and larger firms experience lower market reactions, and
there was no significant reaction to the magnitude of accounting accruals. For the

accruals portion of his research Griffin used net income from continuing operations less
operating cash flow deflated by stockholder equity. Griffin further finds that the market
response increased over the study period (1996 to 2001).
Han and Wild (1997) examined how earnings announcement timing effected
member firms in the same industry, an intra-industry information transfer. They used a
sample of 1,418 firm quarter earnings announcements between 1984 and 1986 to test the
hypothesis that the timeliness of a firm's earnings announcement has an effect on the
stock price of other firms in the industry. Their research showed that there was
information transfer between firms in the same industry. Firms that release information
early have an effect on the share price of other firms in the industry that have not released
earnings information. Subsequent industry earnings announcements have an effect on
only industry firms that have not yet released earnings information. Both the sign and the
magnitude of the reaction vary with the timing of the announcements.

Summary of Timeliness Literature
Chai and Tung (2002) found earnings management present in companies making
earnings announcements five days later than the prior year. Chambers and Penman
(1984) found that earnings announcements are made at traditional time periods following
the fiscal year. Chambers and Penman (1984) and Chai and Tung (2002) used earnings
announcement dates. However, earnings announcements do not contain the information
necessary to calculate the presence of abnormal accruals indicating earnings
management.

While companies have discretion over the time to file, several attributes have
been associated with the timeliness of filing. The company characteristics associated
with variability in timeliness are:
1) company size (Dyer and McHugh 1975),
2) company year end (Dyer and McHugh 1975),
3) extremes in financial performance (Dyer and McHugh 1975),

4) change in auditors (Davies and Whittred 1980),
5) audit complexity (Givoly and Palmon 1982),
6) industry (Ashton et al. 1989),
7) net operating losses (Ashton et al. 1989),
8) the presence of extraordinary items (Bamber et al. 1993), and
9) qualified audit opinions (Bamber et al. 1993).
The early studies reviewed in this section examined timeliness of filing dates.
The later studies examined the timeliness of company earnings announcements. While
the current study focuses on company filing dates, factors that affect the timeliness of
earnings announcements have the potential to affect the timeliness of the annual report
filing.
Delays in receiving audit opinions could affect the timeliness of annual filings.
Keller (1986) found audit delay associated with the annual report'dates providing
evidence that factors that affect audit delay need to be controlled in a study of the
timeliness of annual report filings.

In summary this section has highlighted firm characteristics that are related to
timeliness of company filings and earnings announcements in prior research (Dyer and
McHugh 1975; Chambers and Penman 1984; Bamber et al. 1993). The current study is
testing Trueman's theory that moving earnings from one period to another period
(earnings management) requires time. The literature presented in this literature review
indicates company characteristics which have been reported to have an affect on annual
report timing and must be controlled for in the current study. The literature also indicates
that management has discretion over the timing of earnings announcements and statutory
filings (Chambers and Penman 1984).

Earnings Management
Buckrnaster (2001) presents a history of the extant literature on income smoothing
dating from 1893. Income smoothing is the manipulation of earnings to even out
reported earnings over time, and may be achieved by the discretionary use of accounting
estimates, or changes in accounting estimates to affect a firm's net income. As data
availability and statistical methods have improved, researchers my now examine earnings
management.
Healy and Wahlen (1999) defined earnings management as managers using
judgment in reporting and structuring transactions to mislead stakeholders or influence a
particular outcome. Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggest that earnings management is
intentional, deliberate misstatement or omission, otherwise known as fraud.

Trueman's (1990) theory suggests that earnings management is the results of
firms releasing earnings reports later than expected. Trueman presents two explanations
for his theory: 1) firms adjust their earnings to reduce an unfavorable result, or 2) firms
observe the results from other firms in the industry and then adjust their results
accordingly.
The body of literature on earnings management has grown in the past decade as
indicated by the increase in the number of studies published in this area. Events of the
past three years (Enron, Worldcom, etc.) have increased visibility of the topic. Lynn
Turner, as chief accountant of the SEC, (Turner and Godwin 1999) called for more
research in earnings management to help the SEC. Healy and Wahlen (1999) review
earnings management literature and conclude that the earnings management literature has
mostly focused on understanding if and why earnings management exists. They conclude
that more studies are needed in the pervasiveness of earnings management and what
weaknesses are being exploited by company management to manipulate earnings.
The research described in Healy and Wahlen (1999) tested for the existence of
earnings management by examining firm or industry characteristics that may lead to
earnings management. An example of this research is DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994).
DeFond and Jiambalvo studied 94 firms between 1985 and 1988 that were approaching
debt covenant violations. They hypothesized that firms close to debt covenant violations
would be more likely to engage in earnings management to avoid the debt violation. This
work was supported by the earlier work of Healy and Palepu (1990), in which they
studied 126 firms with dividend covenant restrictions between the time period 1981 and

1985. They found these dividend covenant restrictions were effective in controlling
management decisions.
Jaggi and Lee (2002) divided financially distressed firms into two groups, those
with debt covenant waivers and those firms without such waivers. The results suggest
that firms manage earnings upward if they have obtained waivers. Jaggi and Lee studied
135 firms that experienced either a violation of debt restrictions or a debt restructuring
between the time period 1989 and 1996. They concluded that firms that have not
obtained waivers manage earnings downward. This study offers support that
management choices affect earnings management.
Agency theory indicates management would have an interest in attaining certain
goals. Work in this area includes several studies researching management compensation.
In one of the earliest earnings management studies Healy (1985) found that management
has incentives to make accounting choices that increase management bonuses. Healy
used a sample of 1,527 firm year observations2 for 94 firms. Healy also noted that
executives manipulate income downward when their bonuses are at the maximum payout.
Holthausen et al. (1995) extended the Healy study using a confidential data set of 443
firm years of executive bonus plans, and found that managers manipulate earnings to
obtain bonuses. Guidry, Leone, at a1 (1999) tested the results from Healy's study using
unit level data from one company. The data used comprised bonus information from
over 100 separate business units of a single company for the years 1993 to 1995. Guidry

A firm year observation is an observation for one fm for one year.

et al. found similar results; divisional managers manipulated the earnings of their
respective divisions to reach bonus targets.
The relationship between management compensation and earnings management
has been established and extended in additional studies. Using a sample of 3,439 firm
years between 1980 and 1993, Balsam (1 998) reported that managers use discretionary
accruals to manipulate executive compensation; income increasing accruals were more
significant when tested against executive cash compensation. Balsam found that
executive cash compensation was related to discretionary accruals. He further found that
discretionary accruals which assisted a company in avoiding or reducing a loss were
significantly related to executive cash compensation.
Payne and Robb (2000) studied whether firms manage earnings to meet or exceed
analysts forecasts using an industry abnormal accruals method. Using a sample of 13,532
firm year observations between 1986 and 1997, they hypothesized that firms manage
earnings to meeting or beating analyst forecasts. Payne and Robb found evidence that
management's incentives to meet or beat analyst's forecasts were associated with
earnings management.
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) studied firms with sell or buy recommendations
from analyst. Using a sample of 22,173 firm quarters between 1985 and 1998 the authors
examined earnings management behavior differences between firms with high and low
stock price sensitivity. They defined high stock price sensitivity as companies with a
high price earnings ratio or a high market to book ratio. The authors found that firms
with sell recommendations engaged, ex post, in income increasing earnings management,

while firms with buy recommendations engaged in income decreasing earnings
management.
Other studies examine losses and earnings declines. For example, Burgstahler
and Dichev (1 997) used a sample of 64,466 firm year observations between 1977 and
1994 to study whether firms manage company earnings to avoid earnings decreases or
losses. Their results suggest that firms do avoid losses and earnings declines by earnings
management.
Dutta and Gigler (2002) extended this research by including management
earnings forecasts. Dutta and Gigler's results suggest that, when management is asked to
forecast earnings, there is less earnings management. Management forecasts were further
studied by Jaggi and Sannella (1995) using a sample of 274 management forecasts from
1979 to 1988, these authors examine relationship between management forecasts and
earnings management. Their results indicate that managers use discretionary accounting
choices to meet management forecasts. These results were confirmed by Kasznik (1999),
who used a sample of 499 firm years for 366 firms between 1987 and 1991. The 44
percent of the sample, management had overestimated earnings the authors also report a
significant presence of abnormal accruals that were positively associated with
overestimated forecasts.
Matsumoto (2002) found evidence that management was motivated to manage
earnings to avoid negative earnings surprises. Using a sample of 29,460 firm years fiom
1985 to 1997, Matsumoto hypothesized that management is motivated to manage

earnings when the firm has high institutional investment, high growth prospects, and high
litigation risks.
In an additional earnings management study, Degeorge et al. (1999) suggest that
management has incentive to adjust earnings to exceed three thresholds. The three
thresholds are to: (1) report positive earnings, (2) sustain recent performance, and (3)
meet analysts' forecasts. For a sample of 5,387 firms for the years 1974 to 1984, the
authors found support for each of the hypotheses.
Additional evidence is presented in research on initial public offerings (IPO) and
their effect on earnings management. Researchers have hypothesized that company
management has the incentive to manage earnings upward prior to initial public
offerings. Aharony et al. (1993) examined earnings management prior to IPOs. Their
results found little evidence of earnings management except in small and highly
leveraged firms. The sample consisted of 229 industrial firms offering IPOs between
1985 and 1987. This evidence was extended by other researchers (Teoh, Welch, and
Wong 1998a; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2001) finding similar results.
DuCharme et al. (2001) examined whether firms manipulate earnings upward
prior to an IPO. Using a sample of 171 IPOs from 1982 to 1987, their findings indicate
that company management is motivated to increase the pre-IPO earnings to realize larger
offering proceeds. The authors further conclude that this manipulation could be
responsible for subsequent firm under performance.
Teoh et al. (1998a) used 1,526 IPOs from 1975 to 1984 in their study and found
earnings management present in company filings prior to IPO offerings supporting

Ducharme et al. (2001). However, Teoh et al. also segregated the IPO firms into
quartiles based upon the quantity of the abnormal accruals. Firms in the first (fourth)
quartile, representing the highest (lowest) abnormal accruals, had the worst (best) returns
over the subsequent three years. Firms in the fourth quartile were also more likely to
issue seasoned equity offering twenty percent more often than the first quartile firms.
Teoh et al. (1 998b) found evidence of earnings management in firms prior to a
seasoned public offering in their study of seasoned IPO firms. They used a sample of
6,386 equity offerings between 1970 and 1989. They also found that firms engaging in
earnings management prior to the public offering experienced poor stock performance for
the three years subsequent to the public offering date. Rangan (1998) used a sample of
230 seasoned public offerings from 1987 to 1990. Rangan hypothesized and found
support firms that manage earnings prior to seasoned equity offerings experience poor
performance subsequent to the offering and that managed earnings are not sustainable.
While the IPO research has shown evidence of income increasing earnings
management, other studies have found incentive for earnings management that decreases
earnings. Perry and Williams (1994) study management buyouts, using a sample of 175
firms between 1981 and 1988. Their results indicate that prior to a management buyout,
company managers engaged in earnings management that decreases income. These
findings were supported by Wu (1997), using a sample of 87 management buyouts
between 1980 and 1987, Wu's study expands the prior research by testing third party
takeover mergers. He found support for the hypothesis that no income decreasing
earnings management would be found in non-management buyout firms. He concludes

that management has the incentive to manipulate earnings prior to a management
takeover to reduce the price that management pays for the outstanding stock. In contrast,
management does not have the incentive when the purchaser is a third party.
Erickson and Wang (1999) examined earnings management by acquiring firms in
mergers and acquisitions. They used a sample of 78 that firms negotiated mergers
between 1985 and 1990, and found that managers use earnings management to increase
stock values prior to stock for stock mergers to reduce the acquisition price of target
firms.
Another area of earnings management research examines the political cost
hypothesis which has been defined as firms taking steps to reduce costs associated with
legislative or legal actions. Cahan et al. (1997) examined chemical firms when the U.S.
Congress was considering the superfund legislation, and found evidence that chemical
companies used income-decreasing accruals to reduce company profitability prior to final
legislative action. The authors used a sample of 43 firms that had potential exposure to
the superfhd legislation. The results of their research indicates that these firms used
income reducing earnings management techniques in 1979, the year of the legislation, but
not in 1978 or 1980. Additional income-decreasing accrual use timed to legislation was
found by Key (1997), studied 24 publicly traded firms in the cable industry. Key
hypothesized these firms used income decreasing earnings management during a period
when the U.S. Congress was considering legislative action which would reduce the firm's
financial appearance so they could claim to be an industry suffering a financial downturn
and ask congress to take pity on the poor companies.

To support an industry argument of unfair trading practices, Rayburn and Lenway
(1992) found income decreasing earnings management present in the semiconductor
industry at a time when the industry was filing briefs with the Department of Commerce
to argue unfair trade practices by overseas competitors. The industry and the Department
of Commerce argued that the semiconductor industry was harmed by unfair practices of
Japanese firms. The authors also compared the results to the computer industry to insure
the results were not caused by a recessionary downturn.
In a similar study, Jones (1991) found earnings management among firms during
import relief hearings before the International Trade Commission. The use of accounting
information to determine if an industry is harmed provides great incentive for
management to manipulate results. Using 23 firms from five industries that filed for
trade relief between 1980 and 1985, Jones found evidence to support her hypothesis that
these firms managed their earnings downward.
Hall and Starnrnerjohan (1997) found income decreasing earnings management
for the oil industry when testing against periods when the individual firms faced
litigation. Using 20 oil firms between the years 1974 and 1992, the authors tested six
firms that faced individual litigation against the industry. The results found that these six
firms used income decreasing earnings management in the year that the firms faced
litigation.
Han and Wang (1998) also examined at the oil industry but used the Gulf War as
the source of the political costs. In this study, the authors used 76 companies from the
petroleum industry and the petroleum refining industry, and their results indicate that the

oil companies used income-decreasing accruals to reduce the political costs connected
with profiteering from increases in oil prices connected with the war.
These previous studies all used one industry to test a relationship between
earnings management and the political cost hypothesis. Cahan (1992), using the political
cost hypothesis, tested across industries in a study of 48 companies subject to Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) scrutiny regarding monopolistic practices. The political cost
hypothesis was supported indicating that firms used income-decreasing accruals during
the periods of review by the FTC.
This stream of literature supports the view that management engages in earnings
management in the presence of an incentive. Incentives found to be significant for
company management to manipulate earnings include: I) management compensation, 2)
company losses, 3) analyst forecasts, 4) management forecasts, 5) debt covenants, 6)
initial public offerings, 7) management buyouts, 8) firm acquisitions, and 9) political
costs avoidance.
Beneish (1999) provides some insight into consequences of managers engaging in
earnings management. The Beneish study investigated firms subject to SEC enforcement
actions or litigation. In a sample of 36 firms that were the subject of class action lawsuits
regarding earnings overstatements, the results of the research suggest that manager
employment losses (management turnover) were not larger for firms overstating income
prior to SEC enforcement than for control firms. The SEC was also not likely to enforce
monetary penalties unless the managers sold shares prior to the discovery of the income
overstatement. Beneish suggests that neither employment loss potential or SEC penalties

are sufficient to keep managers from overstating company income when it benefits the
managers.

Market Reaction to Earnings Management
Several studies have examined the market reaction to earnings management.
Sloan (1996), using a sample of 40,679 firm years from 1962 to 1991 found that the
market did not recognize earnings management. Sloan hypothesized that the market
fixates on earnings and not the underlying information from financial statements. His
results indicate that the market misprices stocks as a result of the earnings management.
Subramanyam (1996) expanded the Sloan (1 996) study results. The purpose of
the expansion was to test whether the Sloan findings could be explained by income
smoothing. Using a sample of 2 1,135 firm years from 1973 to 1993 Subramnayam
concludes that the earnings management found by Sloan is not earnings manipulation but
management's efforts to smooth earnings. Subrarnnayam admits that sensitivity tests fail
to rule out the possibility the results could be from earnings manipulation.
Xie (2001) extended this research using a sample of 56,692 firm years between
1971 and 1992. Xie found that, not only did the market fail to recognize the earnings
management, the market over priced the results. In additional testing, Xie further
decomposed accruals into abnormal accruals and normal accruals. Subsequent analysis
indicates that the market is pricing not only the normal accruals, but also the abnormal
(discretionary) accrual components of income.
Collins and Hribar (2000) replicated the Sloan (1996) study using 41,237 firm
quarters between 1988 and 1997. They extended Sloan's work to determine if the

overpricing was the result of post-earnings announcement drift. Their results indicate
that their results are separate from post-earnings announcement drift.
Extending the research on market reaction to earnings management, Balsam et al.
(2002) further researched quarterly 10-Q filing dates. Starting with 37,708 firm-quarter
observations between 1996 and 1998, the authors restricted the firm-quarter observations
used in the study to: 1) firms with a December year-end, 2) quarterly earnings exactly
met or exceeded analyst forecast by one cent, 3) the absolute value of unexpected
discretionary accruals was at least one percent of total assets, 4) the 10-Q was filed within
45 days of the quarter end, and 5) the 10-Q filing date was at least 12 trading days after
the earnings announcement dates. These restrictions reduced their final sample to 613
firm quarters. The authors hypothesize that the use of earnings filing dates is the
appropriate period to test for earnings management because the information required to
recognize earnings management is not available until the financials are filed. Using event
methodology with a long event window, Balsam et al. found that the market recognizes
abnormal accruals and reacts negatively to their presence. The results were greater (more
stock price movement) when using institutional investors as a proxy for sophisticated
investors. A limitation of this study was the use of a sample that contained only firms
suspected of engaging in earnings management. This limitation leaves open a question: if
firms not suspected of managing earnings were included in the test, would the results still
indicate market recognition?
Chai and Tung (2002), using a sample of 10,503 firm year observations between
1991 and 1994, found earnings management present in firms announcing earnings 5 days

later than the previous year. They speculated that late announcers wait to see the results
announced by other firms in the industry, and then manipulate their earnings accordingly.
Additional evidence of the market mispricing accruals is supported by studies
from Teoh et a1 (1998a and 1998b) and Rangan (1998). In Teoh et al. (1998b) the
authors test for earnings management in seasoned equity offerings. After finding
abnormal accruals present before the offering, they further test for a market reaction.
They find that the market prices the offerings based on the manipulated results and the
market fails to adjust for the overstated earnings. Teoh et al. (1998a) replicates the study
using initial public offerings. In both studies the authors conclude that the abnormal
accruals prior to the offering and the overpricing of these accruals lead to the under
performance of these offerings in subsequent years after the offering. Rangan (1998) also
used seasoned equity offerings to conclude that the market temporarily overprices stocks
based upon earnings management present in the financial reports issued prior to the
public offering.

Earnings Management Methodology
The earnings management methodology continues to evolve. As shown by the
research on IPOs, advances in methodology have produced additional results. Early
research by Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) focused earnings management research
on observing abnormal accruals. The early methodology used to study earnings
management measures total accruals and then decomposes the total accruals into two
parts: normal accruals and discretionary accruals. Abnormal accruals are defined as

accrual amounts in excess of the industry average. DeChow et al. (1995) present
evidence that a modified version of a model used by Jones (1991) provides the better
results in a test for abnormal accruals. This Modified Jones Model uses balance sheet
data to make the estimates of abnormal accruals. Hribar and Collins (2002) presented
evidence that the Modified Jones Model is biased for firms with merger activity and
presented a model that eliminates this bias using data from the cash flow statement.
Other researchers have employed methods other than the abnormal accrual
models. However, the vast majority of the earnings management literature of the last
decade focuses on the use of abnormal accruals methodology. Examples of research
using accruals other than abnormal accruals from industry averages include Bauman et al.
(2001) which studies deferred tax expense accrual for earnings management, a method
also used by Phillips et al. (2003). Both of these studies found evidence that firms
manage earnings in methods that do not increase income taxes, thus increasing the
deferred tax expense amounts.
Additional authors have employed methodologies relating to characteristics
specific to certain industries. Examples of research using industry characteristics include
Mensah et al. (1994) who examined characteristics specific to the health care industry.
Additional research by Ahrned et al. (1999), Bhat (1996), and Robb (1998) examined
loan loss reserves in the banking industry.

Summary of Earnings Management Literature
The vast majority of earnings management research has used methods to
segregate abnormal accruals from total accruals. The model used in recent literature, the

cash flow variant of the Modified Jones Model (Hribar and Collins 2002) has evolved
from earlier attempts to measure abnormal accruals.
Earnings management issues have existed in the literature for over a century
(Buckmaster 2001). Research to date has found that earnings management occurs when
management has an incentive to change reported earnings. Incentives that have been
found associated with earnings management include management compensations, analyst
forecasts, avoidance of losses and earnings declines, IPOs, and political costs.
Prior research has tested events where the authors have theorized that there is
sufficient incentive for earnings management to be present. The research to date has
found the presence of earnings management but not how to control earnings management
(Healy and Wahlen 1999). Benish (1999) found that SEC enforcement actions fail to
control earnings management. Trueman (1990) theorized that time is required to manage
earnings. If earnings management requires time as theorized, then the SEC's reduction in
the time to file annual and quarterly reports could reduce the amount of earnings
management.
Several studies have examined the market reaction to earnings management. The
study by Sloan (1996) found that the market did not recognize earnings management and
mispriced stocks as a result of the earnings management. These results are also
supported by Subramanyam (1996). Xie (2001) expanded this research and found that
not only did the market fail to recognize the earnings management, the market over
priced the results. A study by Collins and Hribar (2000) expanded the research of Sloan
by utilizing quarterly filing dates found similar results. However, Balsam et al. (2002)

found that the market reacted negatively to earnings management at 10-Q and 1OK filing
dates. They found higher significant when using a proxy for sophisticated investors. The
results of Sloan, Xie, and Collins and Hribar indicates that the market over prices
abnormal accruals in the long-term but the results of Balsam et al. indicates that the
market recognizes earnings management in the short term.
The Balsam et al. (2002) study used a small sample of firms (6 13 firm quarters)
that were suspected of engaging in earnings management. It is unknown if the results
found by Balsam et al. could be indicated for a larger sample including firms not
suspected of engaging in earnings management. If the results hold true, this adds
additional evidence of the myopic nature of the market.

Literature Review Summary
Trueman (1990) theorized that earnings management delayed firm reporting. The
author proposed two scenarios for this possibility: 1) firms need time to adjust their
results to cover unfavorable company results, or 2) firms wait until others in the industry
have announced earnings and adjust their earnings accordingly. This second proposition
is supported by Chai and Tung (2002) who found earnings management present in firms
that announced results five days later than the prior year. Chai and Tung propose that the
cause of these findings is that firms wait to see the results of other firms before adjusting
(manipulating) their own results.
Givoly and Palmon (1982) conclude that companies file annual reports at
traditional time periods. If earnings management delays reporting as theorized by

Trueman (1980), then controlling for other delay factors, late deviations from the
traditional filing dates could be the result of management manipulating earnings.

Prior researchers have stated that, assuming the efficient market hypothesis holds,
the market already has absorbed most of the information contained in earnings
announcements prior to the release of the data. Ball and Kothari (1991) state that routine
earnings announcements resolve some uncertainty and that this increase in information
produces some volatility surrounding the announcement date. Bartov et al. (2002) found
positive market returns for firms that meet or exceed analyst forecasts. Payne and Robb
(2000) found firms manage earnings upward to meet analyst forecasts. These studies
provide a theoretical basis for the concept that the market could over price abnormal
accruals.
Contrary to studies by Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001), Balsam et al. (2002) found
the market reacts negatively to earnings management at the 10-Q filings dates. Balsam et
al. state that these results are limited because their sample consisted only of firms
suspected of engaging in earnings management.
Previous research provides a foundation for the current study. As indicated in the
prior literature, ,several issues are pertinent to this study. From the timeliness literature it
has been shown that company management has discretion over the timing of the release
of information and that companies release information at traditional time periods. Also
indicated in the timeliness literature are items that have been found to be associated with
delays in timiig. These items: 1) company size, 2) company year end, 3) change in

auditors, 4) audit complexity, proxied by industry or inventory to asset ratio, 5) the
presence of extraordinary items, 6) net operating losses, 7) qualified audit opinions, 8)
industry, and 9) extremes in financial performance must be controlled for in research
regarding timeliness.
The prior research on earnings management has found that company management
is motivated to manage earnings to reach specific goals. Included in these goals is the
expectation to meet or exceed analyst forecasts of company earnings. Researchers to date
have not been able to identifjr methods to control or limit earnings management by firm
management. Research has in fact shown that SEC enforcement actions are not sufficient
to limit earnings management. The research has shown that additional research is needed
to isolate methods to reduce earnings management.
The market recognition of earnings management literature has left contradictory
evidence. Sloan, Xie and others have found that the market does not recognize earnings
management while Balsam et al. found that the market does recognize earnings
management.
The current study provides a foundation to test Trueman's theory that earnings
management requires time. Companies have a limited time to make earnings
announcements and statutory filings. If Trueman's theory of the timeliness of earnings
management is supported, then the reduction of the allowed time to file annual and
quarterly reports mandated by the SEC should reduce earnings management.

CHAPTER I11
THEORY AND RESEARCH METHODS

Annual Report Timeliness
Trueman (1990) theorized that time is required to shift earnings from one period
to another, earnings management. Trueman concludes by stating that the potential exists
for this theory to be empirically tested. Trueman's theory presents a research question of:
does earnings management require time? If earnings management requires time as
theorized, then the SEC regulatory change regarding the reduction of time to file 1OK
reports should reduce firm ability to manage earnings.
Alford et al. (1994) found that most companies were able to file before the 90-day
limit but many did not. The authors present no evidence regarding why companies
delayed the 10K filing. The authors speculate that one possible reason is company
tradition. Givoly and Palmon (1982) also state that one contributing factor to the
timeliness of filing was company tradition. Because most firms were able to file before
90 days and choose not to, the authors speculate that firm tradition dictates the timeliness
of filing. If companies engage in earnings management irregularly, then deviations from
the company traditional filing date could indicate a deviation fiom normal earnings
reporting and indicate earnings management, after controlling for other factors that have
been found associated with filing delays in prior studies.

In a pre-EDGAR study, Easton and Zmijewski (1993) found that company filings
were made close to the filing deadline and left little time for delay. Asthana and Balsam
(2001) note that firms filing on EDGAR have reduced the time to file their annual
reports. If the timeliness theory is correct then controlling for other delay factors,
deviations from the company traditional filing time could indicate earnings management.
To test Trueman's theory, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H 1: Firms that file 1OK reports later than the normal company traditional
filing date have income increasing earnings management present.
Firms not engaging in earnings management should have consistent nuniber of
days to file; a company traditional filing date (Chambers and Penman 1984; Alford et al.
1994). Companies filing later than the traditional filing date, barring extraordinary
events, should present evidence of earnings management, a significant relationship
between abnormal accruals and deviations from the traditional filing date. A minimum of
five years of company filing dates is used to establish the company meanlmedian filing
date. This meadmedian filing date is used as the company traditional filing date. The
difference between the traditional filing date and the actual filing date are deviations from
the traditional date. It is hypothesized that there will be a positive relationship between
abnormal accruals (income increasing earnings management) and this timing difference.
Companies file annual reports at traditional time periods (Chambers and Penman
1984). Chambers and Penman (1 984) found the standard deviation of annual earnings
announcements to be one week. Firms that file their annual reports consistently should
have a standard deviation of one to two days. Thus a firm with a standard deviation of 1

day that filed a report 3 days later than normal (a weekend delay) would be incorrectly
included in the firms suspected of earnings management. After calculating the standard
deviations for the entire sample and for individual industries, additional tests are run
testing companies filing outside the sample standard deviation. This adds an additional
segregation between firms suspected of using earnings management and firms not
suspected of using earnings management.
Chai and Tung (2002) found earnings management present in firms that
announced earnings 5 days later than prior years. They speculate that firms wait to hear
other company announcements before manipulating their results. To test this, tests are

run for firms filing five days later than the company's previous year's filing date.
Firth (1976) found an intra-industry effect in the market reaction to earnings .
Ashton et al. (1989) found an intra-industry effect in market reaction to earnings
announcements. Based on this intra-industry effect, a test is also run for companies filing
later than the industry meanlmedian filing date of the current year to test the intraindustry effect.
Company characteristics which have been identified in prior research that
significantly relate to timeliness of filing are used as control variables in this study. The
control variables used are: (1) log of total assets (size), (2) a dummy variable for firms
with a December or January year-end (busy season audits), (3) a dummy variable for
firms that change auditors (audit delay factor), (4) a dummy variable for the presence of
an extraordinary item (audit delay factor), (5) a dummy variable for negative net income
(bad news), (6) a dummy variable for qualified audit opinion (bad news and audit delay),

(7) two digit SIC code (industry and audit complexity) and (8) a dummy variable for high
distress (extreme financial performance).
A positive relationship between an annual report filed outside the firms traditional
meadmedian filing period and abnormal accruals provides support for the theory that
earnings management requires time. Support for this theory provides support for the
concept that the SEC reduction in time to file can help reduce earnings management.
Alford et al. (1994) examined firms that file SEC form 10K after the statutory
filing period of 90 days. Using a sample of 38,775 10K filings from 7,887 firms between
1978 and 1985, the authors found that 20% of firms missed the statutory filing date.
Further examination revealed common characteristics for late filers. In particular, late
filers are not random but are generally small, have negative earnings changes, low
liquidity, high leverage, and experience negative market reactions. The majority of these
firms also have experienced some unfavorable economic event. Earnings management
has been found to be associated with both preventing negative earnings changes and
preventing negative market reactions in prior research.
The Alford et al. (1994) study found that the market reacted negatively to firms
that filed later than the statutory deadline. The "big bath" theory (Healy 1985) suggests
that firms that cannot manage earnings upward to reach the next target earnings number
should "clean" the financial statement of earnings management. This removal of
abnormal accruals from the financial statements allows future income increasing earnings
management (abnormal accruals) to meet future financial goals. This would suggest that
since these firms are going to be punished by the market (experience negative returns) for

filing subsequent to the statutory period, the firm should remove the earnings
management recorded on the books to allow future reserves to be created. Therefore,
firms filing later than 90 days should exhibit income decreasing abnormal accruals.
Thus, hypothesis two:
H2: Firms that file their annual report later than the statutory 90 days have
income decreasing abnormal accruals.
Supporting this expectation of income decreasing abnormal accruals, Chai and
Tung (2002) found income decreasing earnings management present in late announcers.
Hence, firms filing subsequent to the statutory filing date should also have the presence
of income decreasing abnormal accruals.
Firms selected as filing after the statutory filing dates are firms that file their 1OK
forms later than 93 days from the end of their fiscal yearend. Ninety-three days is used
instead of 90 days to allow for weekend and holidays.

Market Reaction
Beaver (1968) stated that while earnings convey information, there are other more
timely sources of information that contain relatively the same information content.
Therefore, controlling for information asymmetry, it is possible to test market reaction to
information contained in earnings announcements or annual filings that is not available
fiom other sources. One type of information not available at the earnings announcement
date is abnormal accruals.

The availability of information prior to EDGAR was not a timely process, 10K's
were available by visiting the SEC or by writing to request a copy to be mailed. This
slow dissemination of information produced a dispersed market reaction. Easton and
Zmijewski (1993) found little reaction to 10K filings and they attribute this to the slow
dissemination of information. Astana and Balsam (2001) state that this dispersed
reaction resulted in studies such as Easton and Zmijewski (1993) finding no reaction to
10K filings. Astana and Balsam (2001) tested market reaction to company first time 10K
filings on EDGAR. They found market price and volume reaction at the EDGAR filing
dates. With the advent of EDGAR, the information contained in the 1OK is readily
available to a large audience in a short period of time. Griffin (2003) examining market
reaction to EDGAR report filings, reports evidence that the market reaction to EDGAR
report filings has increased over time.
Investors tend to "fixate" on earnings and ignore the underlying financial
information presented to them for analysis (Sloan 1996). By managing earnings,
company management is able to deceive investors. Prior research has shown that
analysts and investors are not interpreting the information content of accruals and the
earnings management reflected in the accrual numbers (Sloan 1996; Bradshaw,
Richardson, and Sloan 2001).
Balsam et al. (2002) found a negative market reaction to earnings announcements

with earnings management present. If the market is efficient as theorized by financial
researchers, there should be a negative market reaction to firms with income increasing
earnings management. Firms which have manipulated their earnings upward to meet

projections have created earnings that are not sustainable. The market should recognize
this limitation and react in a negative manner. However, Griffin (2003) found no market
reaction to total accruals (not abnormal accruals/earnings management). To address these
contradictory findings, hypothesis 3 is proposed:
H3: There is a negative market reaction to company filings that include high
levels of income increasing earnings management.
The Balsam et al. (2002) study which found a negative market reaction to firms
suspected of engaging in earnings management, used a small sample (613) of firm
quarters. The firms selected for study were only firms suspected of earnings
management. Based on their sample restrictions they state they are unable to eliminate
possibilities that the results could be from another explanation. Griffin (2003) did not
test market reaction to earnings management, only total accruals. The lack of results
noted by Griffin could be from using total accruals and not testing earnings management
(abnormal accruals). While total accruals could be highly correlated with discretionary
accruals, individual firm year observations could provide a different result.
Event test methodology is used to test this hypothesis. The event used in the test
is the date the company files the annual report on EDGAR. There should be a negative
market reaction to firms engaging in income increasing'earnings management. The
results of the event tests for firms with earnings management should be the same for
companies filing later than company meadmedian and for companies filing at their
traditional filing times. To control for the market reaction to the earnings announcement,

the market reaction will be calculated based on a base line of six months prior to the
earnings announcement date.
Firms that cannot file the annual report within the statutory 90 days are required
to file a NT 10K for a 15 day extension of time. Griffin (2003) reports a negative market
reaction to firms filing a NT 1OK report. The "big bath" theory would suggest that firms
filing late may have greater income decreasing abnormal accruals. (The market is
already going to punish these firms late and the attitude becomes one of let's clean up the
books.) Givoly and Palmon (1982) found less market reaction to later earnings
announcements. Givoly and Palmon conclude that the market has already absorbed
information from other sources as the cause of the lack of reaction. The market reacts
negatively to a NT filing; at the subsequent (late) 10K filing date there should be little, if
any, market reaction. However, when a company files a 1OK subsequent to a NT filing
there should be a market reaction to firms presenting evidence of earnings management.
Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is presented:
H4: Firms that file later than the statutory period and have income decreasing
abnormal accruals present will have a negative market reaction.
Since the market has already reacted negatively to the NT filing, there should be no
additional market reaction to the subsequent 10K filing.

Model design
The research community has tested various earnings management models;
abnormal accruals (Dechow et al. 1995), changes in deferred taxes (Bauman et al. 2001),

and methods characteristic to certain industries. (Mensah et a1 (1994) reviewed incurred
but not reported expenses in HMO's). However, the most widely used method is the
Modified Jones Model. The Modified Jones Model is a method of measuring nondiscretionary accruals in company financial statements. The theory of the model is that
company management uses discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings.

Modified Jones Model
Dechow et al. (1995) tested four models used in previous studies to measure
earnings management plus a modification to one of the models. The resulting five
models tested were: 1)The Healy (1985) model, 2) The De Angelo (1986) model, 3) The
Jones (1991) model, 4) The Industry model (Dechow and Sloan 1991), and 5) an industry
version of the Jones model. Dechow et al. tested these five models on sample data and
the results of the study indicate that the best and most accurate findings are obtained fiom
a modification of the Jones model (Jones 1991), which they proposed in the 1995 paper.
The industry version of the Modified Jones Model estimates total accruals during the
event period. Estimates obtained from the model are then used to calculate nondiscretionary accruals. The difference between the total accruals and non-discretionary
accruals equals the discretionary accruals.

Cash Flow Accruals
Hribar and Collins (2002) present evidence that tests using accruals from the
balance sheet (Modified Jones Model), have biased results due to the occurrence of

mergers and acquisitions. The Dechow et al. (1995) model (Modified Jones Model) uses
changes in the balance sheet assets and liabilities to calculate total accruals. Mergers and
acquisitions upwardly adjust the balance sheet numbers. These upward adjustments are
not distinguishable from earnings management by the model. Hribar and Collins suggest
using data from the cash flow statement as a substitute in the calculation for total
accruals. This model also picks up additional accruals not considered by the Dechow et
al. version. An example of these additional accruals is deferred taxes which have been
found to be used in earnings management in studies such as Phillips et al. (2003). The
Hribar and Collins modification calculates total accruals as the difference between
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and cash flow from
operations. This calculation is free from the bias of changes in the balance sheet caused
by mergers or acquisitions. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the residuals in the
same manner as (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998; DeFond and
Subramanyam 1998; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999; Chung and Kallapur 2003). The
discretionary accruals are calculated using the following model:
(Model 1)
Where:
ACC = Total accruals
TA.1 = Total assets at the beginning of the year
ASALES = The change in sales adjusted by the change in accounts receivable
PPE = Property, plant, and equipment
This discretionary accrual amount is the dependent variable for the testing.

Prior research has shown several factors to be related to earnings management.
These factors are financial health, size, and growth. Financial health is measured by
three variables: leverage, financial distress, and cash flow. Financial distress is measured
by the Altman z-score. Size is measured by the log of total assets and growth is proxied
by the market to book ratio. Control variables are included to reduce the effect of these
issues.
Prior studies have also found a relationship between abnormal accruals and loan
covenant violations (DeFond and Jiarnbalvo 1994) and a relationship between loan
covenant violations and earnings management (Press and Wientrop 1990). Since high
leverage firms are more likely to manage earnings, leverage is included as a control
variable. LEVERAGE is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Financial
distress has been shown to promote earnings management (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Skinner 1994). To control for financial distress a dummy variable is created for firms
with an Altman z-score below 1.8 1;indicating financial distress (HIDIS). An additional
dummy variable is created for low distress firms (LODIS), firms with an Altman z-score
of above 3.0 in a similar manner to DeAngelo et al. (1994). The third financial health
variable is cash flow. Cash flow is controlled for using log of operating cash flow.
Larger firms have more resources available to them and have greater capabilities
to manage earnings. Size is controlled for using the log of total assets (LNTA). Accrual
levels can vary with the growth characteristics of a firm (Jones 1991;Young 1999). To
control for this variation the market-to-book ratio is used as a proxy for growth (Chung
and Kallapur 2003).

Hypothesis one
Hypothesis one is:
H1: Firms that file 10K reports later than the normal company traditional
filing date have income increasing earnings management present.
The relationship between discretionary accruals and time in this hypothesis is tested using
simultaneous equations analysis. The first model is defined as:
DACC = a0 + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE+ a3LODIS + a4HIDIS + asLNCASH +
a6LNTA + a7PRICETOBOOK+ E

(Model 2)

Where:
DACC = absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated by model (1)
TIME = time variable of interest (detailed below)
LEVERAGE = leverage
LODIS = low distress firms
HIDIS = high distress firms
LNCASH = log of cash flow from operations
LNTA = size proxied by log of total assets
PRICETOBOOK = market to book ratio
The number of calendar days between the company fiscal year end and the day the annual
report is filed with EDGAR is calculated for each firm year. The time variable of interest
is the number of days to file an annual report for the observation less the company
average filing days (evaluated nine different ways, described in the previous section). An
average number of days is calculated for each companylindustry. The time variable is
then the difference between the company findustry average and the number of days for
the individual firm year. The average is calculated as:
1)
2)

Firms filing later than the company mean
Firms filing later than the company median

3)
4)

5)
6)
7)

8)
9)

Firms filing later than the industry mean
Firms filing later than the industry median
Firms filing later than the sample mean
Firms filing later than the sample median
Firms filing more than 5 days later than the prior year
Firms filing more than 5 days later than the industry mean
Firms filing more than 5 days later than the industry median

LEVERAGE is calculated as total debt divided by total assets for each firm year. To
control for financial distress two variables are used to indicate high and low financially
distressed firms. LODIS is a dunlrny variable with a value of one for firms with an
Altman z-score greater than 3.0 and zero for all other firm years. HIDIS is a dummy
variable with a value of one for firms with an Altman z-score less than 1.8 1 and a value
of zero for all other firm years. It is hypothesized that there is a positive relationship
between the time variable of interest and discretionary accruals.
The discretionary accruals testing used in earnings management research uses
discretionary accruals as the dependent variable. This type of testing attempts to find
causation of abnormal accruals. The current research also examines explanations of the
timeliness of annual report filing, to determine the association, if any, between earnings
management and in the filing time of annual reports. Additional testing is conducted
using the timeliness of filing as the dependent variable. For this testing the timeliness is
the dependent variable, discretionary accruals is an independent variable, and the control
variables include the factors shown in previous research to cause delay in annual filings.
Significant results indicate that the abnormal accruals (earnings management) explain
some timeliness of annual reports.

The issues of delay (audit delay, and good newshad news) are included as control
variables in this testing. Proxies for audit delay include presence of extraordinary items,
change in auditor, busy season audits and industry (Ashton et al. 1989). A qualified or
adverse audit opinion is also be included as an audit delay control (Keller 1986).
Negative net income is used as a proxy for reporting bad news (Chambers and Penman
1984). The audit delay proxies, extraordinary items, change in auditor, busy season
audits, presence of an adverse audit opinion, and a negative net income are represented
by a dummy variable indicating the presence of the delay factor. Other characteristics
found to be significant in studies of the timeliness of annual filings include size and
company yearend (Dyer and McHugh 1975). Dyer and McHugh found extremes in
profitability to be significant in reporting delays. Whittred and Zimrner (1984) and
Lawrence (1983) found delays for firms approaching bankruptcy. A dummy variable is
used to represent high financial distress, firms with a z-score of less than 1.8 1. The
resulting model for testing the timeliness of abnormal accruals (and the second equation
for the simultaneous equations model) is:
TIME = a0 + alDACC + a2LNTA+ a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG+ asBUSY + a60PIN +
a7NEGNI+ asHIDIS + E

(Model 3)

Where:
DACC = absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated by model (I)
TIME = the timeliness variable of interest calculated by subtracting the number of
days the annual report is filed with EDGAR fiom average filing number of
days. (A positive value is a firm year filed later than the average.)
LNTA = size proxied by the log of total assets
EXTRA = dummy variable for the presence of an extraordinary item
AUDCHG = dummy variable for a change in auditor fiom the prior year
BUSY = audits conducted during the busy season

OPIN = dummy variable representing a non-clean audit opinion
NEGNI = a reported negative net income
HIDIS = dummy variable for high distressed firms

A days-to-file number is calculated for each firm year as the number of days between the
fiscal year end and the date the annual report is filed with EDGAR. The average days to
file is calculated for each fidindustry. The time variable of interest (TIME) is
calculated by subtracting the meadmedian of the individual companies from the actual
number of days to file the annual report. To control for time delays resulting from
extraordinary items a dummy variable (EXTRA) is created with a value of one
representing the presence of an extraordinary item in the firm year observation and a
value of zero for other firm years. AUDCHG is included to control for a time delay
caused by a change in firm auditors. A dummy variable is created with a value of one for
firm years in which the auditor is different from the prior year. A value of zero is used
for all other firm years. To control for audits conducted during the busy audit season a
dummy variable BUSY is created with a value of one for companies with December and
January yearends and a value of zero for all other firm years. Firms with an audit opinion
other than a clean opinion experience filing delays. To control for this delay factor a
dummy variable (OPIN) is included coded with a value of one for firms with an opinion
other than a clean opinion and a value of zero for all other firm years. Firms with
negative net incomes have been found to have delayed annual report filings. To control
for filing delays associated with negative net income a dummy variable (NEGNI) is
created coded with a value of one for firms years with a net income less than 0. To
control for financial distress a dummy variable (HIDIS) is used. The dummy variable is

coded a value of one for firms with an Altman z-score of less than 1.8 1 and a value of
zero for all other firm years. This testing for hypothesis one is also performed using
sample meanlmedian.
The proposed model 2 theorizes that discretionary accruals are a function of time;
a company that has delayed filing is managing earnings. Model 3 theorized that time is a
function of discretionary accruals; time is required to manage earnings.
Hypothesis two
Hypothesis 2 states:

H2: Firms that file their annual report later than the statutory 90 days have
income decreasing abnormal accruals.
Firms that file late are punished by the market (Alford et al. 1994; Griffin 2003). The big
bath theory would indicate that firms that file their annual report after the 90 days
statutory filing time should display income decreasing abnormal accruals. To test this
hypothesis, the sample is segregated into firms that file timely and firms that file after the
90 day statutory time period. A dummy variable is created for firms filing after the 90
day statutory time period. Logit is used to estimate the following model:
TIME = a0 + alDACC + a2LNTA + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + asBUSY +

a60PIN + a7NEGNI + asHIDIS + E

(Model 4)

Where:
DACC = discretionary accruals calculated by model (1)
TIME = dummy variable for filing after 90 days
LNTA = size proxied by the log of total assets
EXTRA = dummy variable for the presence of an extraordinary item
AUDCHG = dummy variable for a change in auditor from the prior year

BUSY = audits conducted during the busy season
OPIN = dummy variable representing a non-clean audit opinion
NEGNI = a reported negative net income
HIDIS = dummy variable for high distressed firms

TIME is a dummy variable coded with a value of one for firm years filed more than 93
days after the fiscal year end and zero for all other firm years. To control for time delays
resulting from extraordinary items a dummy variable (EXTRA) is created with a value of
one representing the presence of an extraordinary item in the firm year observation and a
value of zero for other firm years. AUDCHG is included to control for a time delay
caused by a change in firm auditors. A dummy variable is created with a value of one for
firm years in which the auditor is different from the prior year. A value of zero is used
for all other firm years. To control for audits conducted during the busy audit season a
dummy variable BUSY is created with a value of one for companies with December and
January yearends and a value of zero for all other firm years. Firms with an audit opinion
other than a clean opinion experience filing delays. To control for this delay factor a
dummy variable (OPIN) is included coded with a value of one for firms with an opinion
other than a clean opinion and a value of zero for all other firm years. Firms with
negative net incomes have been found to have delayed annual report filings. To control
for filing delays associated with negative net income a dummy variable (NEGNI) is
created coded with a value of one for firms years with a net income less than 0. To
control for financial distress a dummy variable (HIDIS) is used. The dummy variable is
coded a value of one for firms with an Altman z-score of less than 1.81 and a value of
zero for all other firm years. It is expected that a negative relationship exists between the

time variable and the signed values of the discretionary accruals indicating income
decreasing abnormal accruals present in firms filing later than the 90 day statutory period.

Market Reaction
The market reaction hypotheses are tested using an event methodology. Balsam
et al. (2002) tested market reaction to earnings management contained in quarterly 10-Q
statements. The period used for the testing in Balsam et al. was 17 days (-1, +15). They
used this long event window subsequent to the event date because analyzing of the
information included in the quarterly reports takes time. The testing for H3, the market
recognition of earnings management, uses the same 17 day event window for testing.
To remove possible seasonality from the results, only firms with December year
ends are used in the sample for the event testing (Beaver 1968; Balsam et al. 2002). This
limitation removed 4,758 observations from the sample. To estimate the stock return
response to the annual report filings, this study uses the market model originally posited
by Sharpe (1963):
(Model 5)
Where:

Ri = market return for stock I
R, = market return for index
This model is estimated by ordinary least squares regression. The value weighted
index return for the S&P500 is used for the index market return in this testing. The
parameters are estimated using daily returns for 180 business days prior to the
announcement day (days-181 to -1) and a minimum of 12 days is required between the
announcement date and the subsequent annual report filing date similar to (Balsam et a1

2002). The results of this testing provide the expected return for individual stocks. The
residual E is computed for each stock for the event period using:
E = Ri - (ao

+ al&)

(Model 6)

where a 0 and a, are obtained from the regressions of the non-event period. A positive
residual implies a positive response and a negative residual implies a negative response.
There is research that indicates that the market reacts to earnings announcements
more than one day prior to the announcement date, the market reacts in anticipation of the
earnings announcement. An additional test of this hypothesis was performed using
parameters calculated using - 181 to - 10 days prior to the announcement date in an effort
to further reduce the market reaction to the announcement date.

Hypothesis three
To test the association between discretionary accruals and abnormal stock returns,
hypothesis three:

H3: There is a negative market reaction to company filings that include high
levels of income increasing earnings management.
the following model is used (Balsam et al. 2002):
(Model 7)
Where:

CARi = the cumulative abnormal return for stock i over the 17 day event window
obtained from model (Model 6)
DACC = the abnormal accruals for stock i obtained from the cash flow variant of
the modified Jones model. (Model 2)
LNTA = size proxied by the log of total assets
UNEXP = unexpected earnings

To control for market reaction to unexpected earnings a control variable UNEXP is
included. UNEXP is a proxy for the unexpected earnings calculated as the difference
between the earnings per share in the prior year and the earnings per share in the current
year. The earnings per share is the earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations. Hypothesis 3 predicts a negative reaction to discretionary accruals; therefore
a negative sign is predicted for a , (an inverse market reaction from discretionary
accruals); the larger the quantity of abnormal accruals the larger the negative market
reaction.
Balsam et al. (2002) used what they called unexpected abnormal accruals. They
defined unexpected abnormal accruals as the difference between the abnormal accruals in
the current quarter and the abnormal accruals in the same quarter from the previous year.
Following this method the study also uses the difference in abnormal accruals from the
prior year as an additional test.

Hypothesis four
Hypothesis 4 investigates market reaction to earnings management included in
financial statement filings filed subsequent to the 90 day statutory filing date. The event
window for the annual filing is the 17 day window (-1, +15) used by Balsam et al.
(2002). Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) used total accruals in their analysis. The results of
the Sloan (1996) and Xie (200 1) research indicate that the market does not react to
earnings management. These two papers tested whether or not the market reacted to total
accruals. The findings of both studies were that the market does not react to total
accruals. Balsam et al. (2002) used discretionary accruals in their analysis. They tested

for a market reaction to a change in discretionary accruals from one year to the next. The
conflicting results from these studies could be explained by this difference. Using the
method described above for models 5 and 6, the market reaction is determined for each
firm. In the current study the market reaction is tested against discretionary accruals and
unexpected discretionary accruals (change from prior year).
Hypothesis 4 states:

H4: Firms that file later than the statutory period and have earnings
management present will have a negative market reaction.
To test this hypothesis, the sample firms are divided into firms filing after the 90 day
statutory period and firms that file timely. The group of firms that filed after the 90 day
period is used in this testing. The resulting sample is tested using model 7. Griffin
(2003) tested market reaction to late filings. Griffin used total accruals (net income
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations less cash flow from operations) as
used by Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001). The current study uses discretionary accruals to
test for different market reactions between firms.

Data collection
Annual 1OK filing dates are available in Edgar starting in 1993. Financial
information to calculate the abnormal accruals using the cash flow version of the
Modified Jones Model is collected fiom Compustat. Financial firms and public utilities
are removed from the sample. The unique financial reporting of the financial firms make
them unsuitable for testing when combined with other industries (Becker et al. 1998).

Public utility firms are removed because they have motivations that differ from other
commercial firms due to the regulatory environment in which they operate. Foreign
domiciled companies are also removed from the sample because foreign firms do not
have the same GAAP requirements as do US domiciled firms. Foreign firms traded in
the US must reconcile net income and retained earnings to US GAAP or they can restate
the financial statements to comply with US GAAP. Compustat does not reveal which of
these options these firms choose, and variations in GAAP could affect the results. The
companies selected for the data sample are limited to firms with over $75 million in total
assets. Smaller firms have been found to have greater variability in the timeliness of firm
filings. Most firms that filed after the SEC mandated due date were small and financially
troubled (Alford et al. 1994). The $75 million number is chosen because the new SEC
regulation of 10K and 10Q filings, when hlly implemented, is limited to firms with over
$75 million in assets.
To determine the company traditional filing period five years of filing data in
EDGAR matched with corresponding Compustat data is required. To eliminate
differences caused by companies using 52-53 week years, actual fiscal year ending dates
are used. The fiscal year-end dates are obtained from Compact Disclosure when
available. The remaining year-end dates are obtained fiom Edgar. The resulting sample
is 23,846 firm year observations.
Market reaction data for the event studies are obtained fiom the CRSP database.
The annual earnings announcement dates are taken from the Compustat database. This
period is used to eliminate the market reaction to the earnings announcement date from

the beta calculation (Balsam et a1 2002). Following Balsam et a1 (2002) the data is
Eurther restricted by requiring that the annual report filing date be at least 12 days
subsequent to the earnings announcement date to eliminate cross contamination of events
(Balsam et a1 2002).

CHAPTER IV
PRESENTATION OF ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

This chapter describes the data and presents the results of the hypothesis testing.
The first section presents descriptive statistics of the sample data used followed by the
empirical results.

Data Description and Discussion
Hypothesis One and Two
Hypothesis one and two test for a relationship between time to file annual reports
and earnings management calculated as abnormal accruals. The data for Hypotheses 1
and 2 came from Compustat, SEC's EDGAR website, and Compact Disclosure. The
annual report filing dates were collected from the SEC's EDGAR website. A total of .
108,037 1OK filing dates were collected from the EDGAR filed between 1994 and 2004.
Financial data for a total of 104'3 17 firm years was collected from Cornpustat after
eliminating financial firms, public utilities, and foreign firms. The days to file the annual
report is calculated in the study as the number of days between the fiscal year end and the
filing date. The fiscal year data included in Compustat does not include 52-53 week year
ends. Company fiscal year end data was collected from Compact Disclosure where
available and the missing year ends were collected from EDGAR. Combining financial
data from Cornpustat with the annual report filing dates from EDGAR produced a

potential sample size of 52,109 firm years with a minimum of three firm years of
observations. However, restricting the sample to firms with a minimum of five firm year
observations further reduced the size to 48,786. Additionally, limiting the firm size to a
minimum of $75 million in total assets eliminated an additional 20,753 firm year
observations.
The number of days to file (DAYSTOFILE) was calculated for each firm year as
the number of days between the company fiscal yearend and the date the annual report
was filed with EDGAR. Detail summary statistics for this sample indicated a non-normal
distribution of the DAYSTOFILE variable. The sample skewness was 5.27 and kurtosis
was 54.91. DAYSTOFILE had a minimum of 14 days and a maximum of 943 days.
Removing outliers, firms filing their annual report within 20 days of earnings
announcement and firms filing their annual report more than 175 days after the earnings
announcement reduced the skewness to .43 and the kurtosis to 8.73. This reduced the
sample size to 23,846 firm year observations. A univariate t test of the DAYSTOFILE
variable produced a t statistic of 932.72 with a P value of 0.000.
Observations where operating cash flows, discretionary accruals, and other
variables were more than three standard deviations from the sample means were
eliminated as outliers following Subramanyam (1996). This resulted in a final sample
size of 18,552 firm years representing 7,934 different firms. Table 1 describes the
sample selection process.
Table 2 provides sample distribution information by industry and year. SIC codes
6000-6999 are financial firms and are eliminated due to the difficulty in estimating the

discretionary accruals for these firms. The number of observations for SIC codes 40004999 is low due to the elimination of public utility firms which are also eliminated due to
estimation difficulties. A total of 58 two digit SIC codes are represented in the sample.
The number of observations by year increases after 1996 due to the SEC full
implementation of required use of EDGAR for filing years 1997 and later. The limited
number of observations for the year 2004 is due to the timing of the sample collection.
The Compustat data was collected from the June 2004 disk. Only a limited number of
firms had reported 2004 year end data at the time the CD was released.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. As expected, a large dispersion is
present in the total assets variable with a skewness and kurtosis of 6.92 and 87.27
respectively. The log of assets (LNTA) is used as the size proxy to reduce this
dispersion. The use of the log of assets variable reduces the skewness and kurtosis to .69
and 2.91 respectively.
The discretionary accruals variable (DACC) has a mean of 0.001 and a standard
deviation of 0.105. The discretionary accruals average less than one percent of total
assets in this sample, and are not widely dispersed. A univariate t test of the DACC
variable produced a t statistic of -.003 with a P value of 0.000. A t test of the mean of
DACC for firms filed timely vs. the mean of DACC for firms filing late (using the
companies mean definition of filing late) produced a t test value of 43.078 1 with a P
value of 0.000.
One assumption of linear regression models is that there is no linear relationship
between the independent variables. A linear relationship between two independent

variables (multicollinearity)can result in inefficient estimators in the regressions. Table
4 presents correlation matrixes for the variables used in the models for testing
Hypotheses 1 and 2. The results indicate an inverse relationshp between the low distress
and the high distress dummy variables. This is expected as a firm in high distress should
not be represented in the low distress variable. The other relationship indicated in Table
4 is between the log of assets and the log of cash flow. The log of assets variable is the
proxy for firm size. The cash flow variable is also affected by company size and the
relationship is probably a result of firm size

Hypothesis Three and Four
The data for Hypothesis 3 and 4 use the dataset described above and then adds
market data obtained from CRSP. The final sample of 18,552 firm year observations
used in Hypotheses 1 and 2 was matched to data available from the CRSP database. This
removed 4,70 1 firm year observations fiom the database. Limiting the observations to
companies with December year-ends removed a further 4,758 observations from the
database. Year 2003 data was also dropped because CRSP data was not available (2,225
observations). A further 626 observations were removed as outliers. Observations where
cash flow, discretionary accruals and price to book ratio that were greater than three
standard deviations from the mean were dropped as outliers. These restrictions reduced
the dataset available for Hypotheses 3 and 4 to 6,242 firm year observations. Table 5
provides sample distribution statistics for the market reaction data.
The calculation of the cumulated abnormal returns (CAR) resulted in a mean
value of 1.2556 and a standard deviation of .0980 for CAR. A univariate t test of the

CAR'S was performed testing the mean of CAR for firms with discretionary accruals
greater than the mean vs. the mean of CAR for firms filing with discretionary accruals
less than the mean. This test produced a t value of 4.9633 with a P value of 0.000.

Empirical Results
It is theorized that time to file annual reports has an effect on discretionary
accruals. It is also theorized discretionary accruals have an effect on time to file annual
reports. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is tested using simultaneous equations of models 2 and

3.

Hypothesis One Results
Hypothesis 1 states that firms filing later than average will have income
increasing discretionary accruals. Fili-nglater than average, the time variable of interest
in the simultaneous equations, is measured in the nine different methods as stated earlier.
A simultaneous equations model was used to test for the various definitions of the
timeliness of annual report filing. The discretionary accruals used in these results were
residuals calculated by model 1. The absolute value testing provides information
regarding the magnitude of discretionary accruals in relation to the time of annual report
filing. However, the hypothesis states that income increasing discretionary accruals will
be present in later filing firms. The absolute value of discretionary accruals will indicate
the magnitude but not the direction of the discretionary accruals. The signed value of the
discretionary accruals will be used to test hypothesis one.
The Hausman (1978) specification test for endogeneity indicates that the number
of days to file annual reports and discretionary accruals are endogenous ( X 2 statistic =

1178.98 significant at the .000 level). Further, the Durbin Wu Hausman test finds a
simultaneity bias between the two models (models 2 and 3) used to test hypothesis one (F
value = 1542.13 significant at the .000 level). This indicates that days to file and
discretionary accruals are jointly determined and requires the use of simultaneous
equations estimation to provide consistent and unbiased estimators.
Table 6 provides variable definitions used in the remaining tables.
Hypothesis I theorizes that a relationship exists between earnings management
and the time to file annual reports. An initial analysis of the relationship was conducted
using simultaneous equations for models 2 and 3. The number of days between the
company year end and the annual report filing date with EDGAR was used for this initial
testing. The results of this initial testing are presented in Table 7. The table presents the
results of testing the absolute value of discretionary accruals, a measure of the magnitude
of earnings management, and the signed value of discretionary accruals, a measure of the
direction of earnings management. The results of this testing indicate a positive
relationship exists between the company filing date and the absolute value of
discretionary accruals significant at the .O1 level with a t value of 7.17 for the days to file
variable and 6.6378 for DACC (discretionary accruals). The positive relationship means
that more earnings management is occurring with later filings, as predicted. The signed
values of discretionary accruals have a negative relationship between the time variable
(TIME) and discretionary accruals (DACC) significant at the .O1 level with a t value of

8.75 for TIME and is not significant for DACC. This indicates that the earnings

management that is occurring later is income decreasing in direction contrary to
prediction in hypothesis one.
The r2 goodness of fit used in ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) has no
statistical meaning in the context of two staged least squares regressions. The model
does provide a F statistic of 80.27 and a corresponding P value of 0.000 indicating the
model is significant in explaining some of the variation present in the variables. Using
OLS regressions for the individual component equations produced an adjusted r2of
0.1490 for a model using discretionary accruals as the dependent variable (model 2). An
OLS regression of model 3, using TIME as the dependent variable, produced an adjusted

I'2 of 0.0905.
The analytic testing of late filers for Hypothesis 1 is presented in Tables 8 to
Table 16. Hypothesis 1 states that companies filing late have income increasing earnings
management present. Filing late is defined for this research in nine different methods.
The tables present the results of the following tests:

1: Later than company mean
2: Later than company median
3: Later than industry mean

4: Later than industry median

5: Later then the sample mean
6: Later then the sample median
7: 5 days later than prior year
8: 5 days later than industry mean

9: 5 days later than industry median

The results present consistent relationships in magnitude and direction of the
discretionary accruals. For all tests, firms filing later than average have income
decreasing abnormal accruals but at a greater magnitude (greater manipulation). Time is
required to manipulate earnings as hypothesized. The results further indicate that
decreasing earnings management is associated with later filings contradictory to the
hypothesis.
In six of nine cases the signed value of DACC is not significantly related to the
TIME variable. However, the TIME variable is consistently negatively associated with
the signed values of DACC.
The results using the absolute value of DACC indicate a consistent, significant,
and positive relationship between DACC and TIME.
The coefficient of the DACC variable indicates that firms are not manipulating
earnings to a great degree. For example, the coefficient for filing later than the company
median is 765.4044 (table 9). This indicates that in order for a firm to change the
discretionary accruals by 1% of total assets a firm would need to file the annual report
765 days (over 2 years) later than the company median. The median for TIME is 1.54
indicating that the average firm files only 1.5 days later than the company median. This
1.5 days is probably explained by weekend differences.

In contrast to the hypothesized results, the direction of the discretionary accruals
is negative for firms filing later than average for firms filing later than the various
measures of company average.
These results indicate that firms filing later than average are decreasing abnormal
accruals. A possible explanation of these results is that firms know how they are going to
manipulate the results and minor manipulation occurs consistently over time. This is
supported by the positive relationship between the absolute value of DACC and filing
late. However, the occurrences where large manipulations appear, the manipulation is in
the negative. This would be consistent with the big bath theory of cleaning the books
when the increases are no longer possible.

LEVERAGE is significant in all measures of late. For all occurrences the
coefficient is negative for the absolute value of DACC and positive for the signed value
of DACC. A positive relationship was predicted. The positive relationship present in the
signed values of DACC indicate that more highly levered firms have income increasing
abnormal accruals, as predicted. The negative relationship between the absolute value of

DACC and LEVERAGE indicates that the higher levered firms have lower magnitudes of
discretionary accruals.
The high distress variable (HIDIS) is consistent in all tests where the high distress
is significant. A positive relationship between high distressed firms and higher levels of
abnormal accruals as theorized in the literature. Consistent with this, the signed values of

DACC have a positive relationship and indicate that highly distress firms are increasing
income through the use of discretionary accruals. However, the absolute value of DACC

variable has a negative relationship indicating that the manipulation that is being used by
these firms is small in quantity.
The low distress variable (LODIS) has a negative coefficient in all tests. This
negative coefficient for the low distress variable (LODIS) is negative as predicted
indicating lower levels of earnings management for stronger firms.
The sign of the coefficient of the cash flow variable (LNCASH) is consistent
when significance. No prediction is made in the literature regarding the sign of the cash
flow variable. For the signed values of DACC the LNCASH variable has a negative
coefficient indicating income decreasing discretionary accruals associated with higher
cash flows. In the absolute value DACC regression, the LNCASH coefficient has a
positive sign indicating greater magnitude of discretionary accruals associated with
higher cash flow.
The size control variable log of total assets (LNTA) is significant in most cases.
The coefficient is negative as expected in all the significant cases indicating that smaller
firms have higher discretionary accrual percentages as predicted.
The growth firm proxy variable, the price to book ratio is significant in only two
cases; filing later than company mean and filing later than company median. The
positive coefficient indicates that lower growth firms, firms with a higher price to book
ratio, have lower discretionary accruals. No prediction was made with respect to this
variable.

Sensitivity Analysis
There is concern that one year, or group of years could provide significantly
different results. Year dummy variables were created in the dataset. Table 17 provides
the results of the analysis including year dummy variables. In this analysis days to file
was used as the time variable of interest and a late variable was not included. The results
of this testing, are consistent with the results of the prior testing of the late filers
presented above. For the signed vales of discretionary accruals, the sign of the
coefficient of days to file is negative indicating a income decreasing discretionary
accruals are associated with later filings. The coefficient of the absolute value of the
discretionary accruals variable has a positive sign indicating later filers have greater
magnitude of discretionary accruals.
The year 2001 brought corporate scandals and greater regulatory scrutiny to
financial reporting. Indicated in the year results is a significant difference between years
in the years subsequent to 2000. The results presented in the earlier tables could be a
result of only the most recent years. To test for this change a dummy variable was
created for fiscal years subsequent to 2000. The results of this testing are included in
Table 18. While a significant relationship exists (t values of 5.52 for pre 2000 filers and
6.37 for post 2000 filers for the discretionary accruals variable), the affect of time to file
on discretionary accruals is significant (t values of 7.39 and 9.07 for the time to file
variable for pre 2000 and post 2000 filers respectively) and consistent with the prior
findings.

The coeflicient of the TIME variable is smaller for post 2000 and the DACC
coefficient is larger for post 2000. Contrary to expectations, these results indicate greater
manipulation subsequent to 2000. A possible explanation for these results could be that
the post 2000 period was also a recessionary period and companies had more incentive to
manipulate earnings during this period. Further the testing presented in the prior tables
indicated that the later filers presented evidence of income decreasing earnings
management. There results are consistent with the big bath theory and could indicate
balance sheet cleaning.
Hypothesis One Summary
The findings provide support for the hypothesis that there is a relationship
between discretionary accruals and time to file annual reports. The results suggest that
firms filing later than average are manipulating earnings downward. The results would
suggest that firms manipulate earnings on a consistent ongoing basis. Deviations from
this appear to be income decreasing in nature. Therefore, Hypothesis 1, companies filing
later than average have income increasing earnings management present, is not
supported. While a relationship exists between discretionary accruals and time to file
annual reports, the relationship is contrary to the hypothesis.

Hypothesis Two Results
Hypothesis 2 states that firms filing later than the SEC mandated 90 day filing
period would have income decreasing earnings management present. The testing for this
hypothesis was performed by creating a dummy variable for late filers, firms filing later
than 93 days. The 93 day number is used to control for weekend variations. This dummy

variable was then used as the dependent variable in a logit model that includes
discretionary accruals and delay control variables as dependent variables.
Table 19 presents the results of testing Hypothesis 2. Both the magnitude of
discretionary accruals and the direction of discretionary accruals are significant in
determining companies filing after the statutory period. The t values are 5.05 and 3.72
for the unsigned and the signed values of discretionary accruals respectively. The control
variables used in the model are all significant at the -01 level except the variable for non
clean audit opinion which was dropped (The opinion variable was 100% associated with
late filing). Support is found for Hypothesis 2 that firms filing subsequent to the statutory
filing period (90 days) have income decreasing discretionary accruals.

Hypothesis Three Results
Hypothesis 3 states that the market recognizes and reacts negatively to income
increasing abnormal accruals present in the annual report filings. To test this hypothesis
the cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for each firm year for a 17 day event
window surrounding the annual report filing date using model 6. The cumulative
abnormal return was then regressed on the discretionary accruals variable. The results of
the testing of Hypothesis 3 are presented in Table 20. Four separate tests were conducted
for market reaction. Two tests were run for discretionary accruals, and two tests were run
for the absolute value of discretionary accruals. A significant t value for the discretionary
accruals variable would indicate that the market is reacting to the presence of
discretionary accruals. Using the methodology of Balsam et al. (2002) unexpected
discretionary accruals are calculated and the cumulative abnormal return regressed upon

this unexpected accruals variable. The second set of tests was run using unexpected
discretionary accruals, and absolute value of unexpected discretionary accruals.
The four tests for Hypothesis 3 failed to produce significant results indicating a
market reaction to discretionary accruals. The test for market reaction to discretionary
accruals produced a t value of .52 for both the absolute value and the signed values of
discretionary accruals respectively. The tests using the unexpected discretionary accruals
variables produce t values of .66 and .67 for the signed and unsigned discretionary
accruals variables respectively.
Sloan (1996) and Xie (200 1) found no reaction to accruals in market tests.
Balsam et al. (2002) found a market reaction to unexpected abnormal accruals in a
market reaction test around quarterly filing dates. The Balsam et al. study used very
restrictive constraints in their data selection process. These restrictions resulted in a
sample size of 613 firm quarters. In their sensitivity analysis Balsam et al. state that they
could not eliminate the possibility that their results were from sample selection bias. The
current research extended the Balsam et al. study by using a larger data set that included
firms suspected of earnings management and firms not suspected of earnings
management.
One of the selection criteria used in the Balsam et al. study was firms that meet
analyst forecast or exceeded the analyst forecast by one cent. Prior research has found
that the market reacts to firm results that vary fiom analyst forecasts. Analyst forecast
data is unavailable to use in the current study. A proxy for unexpected earnings was used
in this testing. If analyst forecast dispersion and/or firm reported income variance fiom

analyst forecast was used as a control variable, significant results could be found for this
hypothesis.
Sensitivity Analysis
The testing for Hypothesis 3 failed to produce significant in one of the two tests
for indicating a market reaction to discretionary accruals. Additional testing was
performed to confirm the results. Balsam et al. (2002) used unexpected abnormal
accruals (change in abnormal accruals from the prior period). Unexpected accruals were
included in the testing of the current research. There is the possibility that the market
only recognizes extreme changes in accruals and this is what Balsam et a1 found. The
sample used in the current study includes firms not suspected of managing earnings. An
additional test was performed using extremes in abnormal accruals. Extreme abnormal
accruals were selected as the top and bottom decile of abnormal accruals. The results
(Table 22) of this test were the same, no market reaction (recognition).
At the time of the earnings announcement the information needed to observe the
presence of earnings management is not available. If the market reacted significantly to
the earnings announcement and then found the announcement included managed
earnings, there could be a negative market reaction to the annual filing. The cumulative
abnormal return was calculated for the earnings announcement period (day -1 to day +2).
The results were used in several different tests of the cumulative abnormal return around
the filing date. The first test was to control for the announcement reaction. As expected
a significant relationship exists between the returns for the announcement period and the
returns for the filing period. However, no relationship exists between the filing date

cumulative abnormal return and the discretionary accruals when controlling for the
announcement period abnormal returns.
The market reaction to earnings announcements has been documented to begin
several days before the actual announcement; the market reacts in anticipation. The betas
for the testing of hypothesis three were calculated using - 181 to - 1 days prior to the
earnings announcement date. A additional test was performed using - 181 to - 10 days
prior to the earnings announcement date to eliminate the market reaction to the earnings
announcement from the beta calculation. The results of this testing are presented in table
21. The results indicate that the market doses not recognize discretionary accruals,
column 1 and 2 of the table. However, the market does react to unexpected discretionary
accruals, the difference between the discretionary accruals from the prior year and the
discretionary accruals in the current year. Column three of table 2 1 presents the results of
testing the absolute value of the change in discretionary accruals. The results are
significant at the .O1 level with a t statistic of 2.59. The positive sign of the coefficient
indicates that the market is reacting positively to an increase in discretionary accruals.
Column four of the table presents the results of testing the signed values of discretionary
accruals. The negative coefficient of the discretionary accruals variable indicates that the
market reacts negatively to income increasing discretionary accruals. The t statistic
(2.37) is significant at the -05 level.
The Balsam et al. (2002) results appear to be a result of sample selection and not a
market reaction as concluded in their paper. This would contribute to the lack of
significant results for this hypothesis. Balsam et al. selected firms that met analyst

forecast or exceeded the forecast by one cent. The market reaction documented in their
study could be a market reaction to the results instead of the suspected earnings
management.

Hypothesis Four Results
Hypothesis 4 is testing for market reaction to abnormal accruals in companies that
file their annual reports subsequent to the statutory 90 filing period. Of the 6,242 firm
years included in the market reaction data set, 88 of these firms filed their annual reports
subsequent to the 90 day period. This dataset of 88 firm years is used for testing
Hypothesis 4. The testing of Hypothesis 4 was performed in the same manner as
Hypothesis 3. The cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for each firm year for
the 17 day event window. These returns were then regressed on the discretionary
accruals to test for a market reaction (market recognition). The results of the testing for
market reaction are presented in Table 23. The testing produced insignificant results (t
values of 1.34 and 1.30 for discretionary accruals) which indicate the market does not
react to abnormal accruals (earnings management) present in filers subsequent to the 90
day period. This finding is consistent with the finding of Hypothesis 3 that found no
market reaction to abnormal accruals. The market reaction was tested for absolute value
of abnormal accruals (magnitude), signed values of abnormal accruals (direction).
The unexpected abnormal accruals used by Balsam et al. (2002) were also tested
for Hypothesis 4. Consistent with Hypothesis 3 and the findings from discretionary
accruals above no significant reaction was indicated (t values of 1.05 and 1.09 for
unsigned and signed discretionary accruals respectively).

The hypothesis also predicted that the sign of the abnormal accruals would be
income decreasing. The companies would be removing the earnings management
consistent with the big bath theory. Consistent with the results of Hypothesis 2, the
abnormal accruals for all 88 of the late filers had a negative direction indicating income
decreasing earnings management. This provides support for the theory that companies
filing later than the statutory period are going to "clean" the books and remove earnings
manipulation to use in subsequent years.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter summarizes the study, the conclusions are discussed, identifies
limitations of the study, and suggests future research.

Summary
The SEC has reduced the time for companies to file their annual and quarterly
financial reports. The announcement of this change in The Wall Street Journal states that
this is a response to the accounting scandals of Enron and other companies. The ofticia1
SEC release states that providing information to the stakeholders sooner would be
beneficial. Prior accounting literature theorizes that earnings management requires time
to physically move earnings from one period to another. If the theory is true then the
SEC reduction of time to file should reduce company ability to manage earnings. If the
market recognizes earnings management then providing the information to the
stakeholders sooner would be beneficial for stakeholders to adjust their portfolios based
upon the new information.
This study tests the theory that earnings management requires time by examining
abnormal accruals in relation to the quantity of time between company year ends and the
statutory annual report filing. More specifically, the study examines abnormal accruals
present in firms that file later than company average. Prior accounting literature finds

that companies file at traditional filing dates. Deviations from these traditional filing
dates indicate time series shocks. If companies are manipulating earnings inconsistently
and time is required to move earnings from one period to another, then abnormal accruals
(earnings management) should be present in firm years filed later than company average.
The SEC announcement stated that reducing the filing time would provide
information to stakeholders sooner. If the market recognizes earnings management then
providing the information to the stakeholders sooner would be beneficial. The prior
accounting literature is inconsistent in the conclusion regarding the market recognition of
earnings management. Studies such as Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) found the market
does not recognize the accruals portion of earnings. Balsam et al. (2002) found that the
market does recognize earnings management. The present study uses the methodology of
the Balsam et al. study and the larger sample sizes of Sloan and Xie to mitigate this
inconsistency.
Simultaneous equations are used to answer the question of the effect of timeliness
of report filing on abnormal accruals. The Hausman specification test finds that there is
endogeneity between the timeliness of filing and abnormal accruals. Prior studies in this
area have ignored the endogeneity and as a result, have presented biased results.

-

This study draws upon prior accounting research to develop four research

hypotheses. It is hypothesized that there is a relationship between abnormal accruals and
the time companies file their annual reports. It is hypothesized that there is abnormal
accruals present in annual report filings filed after the statutory 90 day filing period. It is
hypothesized that the market does recognize earnings management in company annual

report filings. Finally, it is hypothesized that the market recognizes earnings
management present in companies filing after the statutory 90 day filing period.
To test these hypotheses a sample size of 18,552 firm years for Hypotheses 1 and
2 and a sample size of 6,242 firm years for Hypotheses 3 and 4 was collected. To test
Hypothesis 1 two models were developed from the prior literature. The first model
included variables found to affect the abnormal accruals and the second model included
variables found to affect the timeliness of report filing. These two models were then used
to test the simultaneous equations model for ~ ~ ~ o t h e1.s Hypothesis
is
2 was tested using
a logit model to test for significance relationship between discretionary accruals and
firms that file after the statutory 90 day filing period. The model used to test Hypotheses

3 and 4 was developed by Balsam et al. (2002).
Conclusions
Hypothesis one states that firms that file 10K reports later than the normal
company traditional filing date have income increasing earnings management present.
This study fails to find support for Hypothesis 1 as written. However, a relationship is
found to exist between time to file annual reports and earnings management but not in the
direction hypothesized. Support is found for Hypothesis 2, a relationship exists between
earnings management and firms filing annual reports subsequent to the 90 day statutory
filing date. Hypotheses 3 and 4 theorize that the market recognizes earnings
management. Partial support was found for Hypotheses 3. And no support was found for
Hypothesis 4.

The result of Hypothesis 1 testing presents evidence supporting the theory that
physically moving earnings from one period to another requires time. In testing the
simultaneous equations model for all firms regardless of filing late or on time, the model
finds support for the theory. However, support is not found for the theory that income
increasing discretionary accruals are associated with firms filing later than average.
Support was found for Hypothesis 2, that there would be earnings management
present in companies filing subsequent to the statutory 90 day filing period. The logit
model found a significant difference between the two groups providing support for the
hypothesis. The theory is that companies filing subsequent to .the statutory filing period
are going to be punished by the market providing less motivation for the manipulation of
earnings. With less motivation to move earnings upward, there should be income
decreasing abnormal accruals present in these firm years. The test of the model using the
signed values of DACC found income decreasing accruals present in the late filers
consistent with the big bath theory.
Hypothesis 3 states that the market recognizes earnings management. The models
used for testing this hypothesis were developed by Balsam et al. (2002). In the Balsam et
al. study the authors found the market does react negatively to earnings management.
However, they used numerous restrictions and were unable to present evidence that the
conclusion was not the results of the sample selection. By restricting the calculation of
the betas to ending 10 days prior to the earnings announcement date a market reaction
was found to unexpected discretionary accruals.

The accounting literature documents lower market reaction to later filings. The
relationship found in the testing of Hypothesis 1 between earnings management and the
timeliness of reporting would support the lack of market reaction to earnings
management. Firms that are engaging in earnings management are filing reports later
than other firms. The market reaction to the later filing is reduced, therefore, a reaction,
if any, to earnings management may not be detectable.
No support was found for Hypothesis 4 regarding market reaction to earnings
management in companies filing subsequent to the statutory filing period. All but 2 firm
years included in this subsample possessed income decreasing abnormal accruals. While
there was income decreasing abnormal accruals present in this group, the market failed to
recognize and adjust the market price for the presence of earnings management.
The overall conclusion to be generated from this study is that time is required to
physically move earnings from one time period to another. This is important because it
provides support for the SEC's move to reduce the time to file annual and quarterly
reports by suggesting that this reduction of statutory filing time helps reduce earnings
management. The study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the steps
being taken by the SEC can help reduce future earnings management.
The study further contributes to the literature by helping to resolve some of the
inconsistent research results regarding the market recognition of earnings management.
The prior literature on market recognition of earnings management presents two diverse
conclusions regarding the subject. The results of this study help provide support that the

market does recognize changes in discretionary accruals fiom the prior year. The market
does not recognize discretionary accruals that are higher than industry averages.

Limitations
The tests and conclusions presented in this study should be viewed in context.
While this study used as many industries as possible, utilities and financial institutions
were omitted because of the difference in the nature of their financial specifics. The
conclusions of this study cannot be extended to those industries. This study covers a
specific period of time. Financial standards and ethics change over time, the results of
this study should apply to years beyond the years included in the study but caution must
be used to generalize these results to other years.
The current study may have ignored other variables that could explain some of the
variation in the dependent variables. The study attempts to mitigate some of the potential
omitted variable bias by using a cross-sectional panel study design. This does not
guarantee that all possible omitted variables have been controlled for in this manner.
Limitations on data chosen for the study could have eliminated the possibility of
other conclusions. Another set of data with a different set of restrictions could find
different conclusions using the same model.
The market reaction data is limited to firms with annual earnings announcement
dates available. This restriction is placed upon the data in order to have the
corresponding annual report filing date.

Recommendations for Future Research
This study used only annual report filings. The study needs to be extended to
include quarterly filings. The timeliness of quarterly reports could show different results.
The market reaction results of Balsam et al. used quarterly reports. It is possible that
using quarterly data, a market reaction to earnings management could be detected instead
of only a reaction to changes in discretionary accruals from the prior period.
The present study found that the market does not recognize earnings management
only changes from prior years. Future research needs to be performed to understand why
the market does not recognize and react to earnings management. This research could
lead to increase disclosure requirements to improve the transparency of financial results.
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Tables

TABLE 1
Sample Selection

Timeliness
Sample
(fum years)
Initial dataset
Removed for less than 5 fm year observations
Removed for total assets <$75 million
Removed for days to file > 175
Removed for days to file < 20
Lost for initial year*
Lost for missing data points
Removed for outliers
Data available in CRSP
Year 2003 observations
Limited to December year ends
Final sample size for H1 and H2

52,109
-3,323
-20,753
-542
-19
-3,626
-3,47 1
-1,823

18,552

Market
Reaction
Sample
(fmyears)
18,552

-626
-4,701
-2,225
-4,758
6,242

* The calculation of abnormal accruals uses a beginning lag year of total assets, 3,626 firms years
did not have a prior lag year of data available.

TABLE 2
Distribution of Days to File

I

SIC
Codes*
20-29
30-39
50-59
70-79
80-89
90-99

I

Observations
1,162
3,561
6,011
1,494
3,090
2,402

Minimum Maximum
File Days File Days
33
170
22
174
23
169
21
173
24
175
24
166
33
167
143
36

Percentage
of Total
Sample
6.3%
19.2%
32.4%
8.1%
16.7%
12.9%
4.0%
0.5%

Minimum Maximum
File Days File Days
33
165
26
163
35
166
170
23
22
170
166
25
173
26
24
175
174
25
167
22
117
21

Percentage
of Total
Sample
5.0%
4.9%
6.7%
10.5%
12.2%
12.8%
12.4%
12.1%
11.5%
10.8%
1.2%

18,552

* SIC codes 6000-6999 are financial firms and were eliminated ffom the sample.

TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Analysis
Units
Sales
Assets
Log of Assets
Net Income
Negative Net Income
Cash Flow (Operations)
Log of Cash Flow
LEVERAGE
Days to File
Discretionary accruals
ABS DAC
2-score
Price to Book Ratio
Extraordinary Items
Extra
Low Distress
High Distress
Auditor Change
Busy
Opinion

$ Millions
$ Millions

% Millions
$ Millions

Percent
Days
Percent

$ Millions

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

10.20 69,506.10 1,956.41
75.02 113,105.00 1,953.99
4.32
6.42
1 1.64
61.92
-1 1,826.00 6,296.80
0.25
1.OO
0.00
- 1,413.30 3,900.00 170.45
4.02
-3.91
8.27
0.27
0.00
3.74
21-00
82.82
174.00
-.924
.OO1
.953
0.00
.953
.067
-36.94
311.41
4.56
-77.21
90.27
2.72
-4.17
-16,778.52 6,923.87
0.16
0.00
1 .OO
0.56
0.00
1 .OO
0.20
0.00
1 .OO
0.00
1.OO
0.10
0.00
1 .OO
0.68
0.00
0.00
1 .OO

The sample size is 18,552fm years representing 7,934separate f m s .

Median

Std.Dev.

522.22 4,472.67
495.96 4,747.56
6.21
1.38
358.44
16.16
0.43
0.00
38.20 421.51
1.64
3.95
0.24
0.24
12.09
87.00
.009
.lo5
.044
.080
7.14
3.22
5.37
1.85
150.72
0.00
0.37
0.00
0.50
1 .OO
0.40
0.00
0.30
0.00
0.46
1.OO
0.02
0.00

TABLE 4
Correlation Matrix

DAYSTOFILE
LEVERAGE
LODIS
HIDIS
LNCASH
LNTA
PRICETOBOOK
EXTRA
AUDCHG
BUSY
OPIN
NEGNI

DAYSTOFILE
LEVERAGE
LODIS
HIDIS

DAYST
OFILE _leverage
1.OOOO
0.1212
1.0000
-0.0701
-0.553 1
0.0929
0.4967
-0.2724
-0.013 1
-0.0247
0.1 160
-0.0656
-0.1290
0.0014
0.2045
0.0524
0.0032
-0.0510
0.0742
0.01 18
0.0075
0.1394
0.2427

LODIS

HIDIS

1.OOOO
-0.5407
-0.0540
-0.1233
0.2047
-0.2025
-0.0071
-0.11 12
0.0013
-0.2947

1.0000
-0.0540
0.0901
-0.1440
0.1891
0.0127
0.1268
-0.0085
0.3680

LNTA

PRICETO
BOOK

EXTRA

AUDCHG

1.OOOO
0.8498 1.OOOO
0.1649 0.1022
0.0937 0.1568
-0.0492 -0.0558
0.1 136 0.1294
-0.0069 -0.0002
-0.2223 -0.0836

1.OOOO
-0.0542
-0.0220
0.0102
-0.0056
-0.1247

1.OOOO
0.0582
0.0472
0.0020
0.0837

1.OOOO
-0.0297
0.0058
0.0083

LNCASH

Number of days between the fm year end and the 10-K filing on EDGAR
Financial leverage of fm in the current year
Low distress z-score of above 3.0
High distress - z-score of less than 1.81
Log of cash flow fiom
LNCASH
operations
Log of total assets
LNTA
PRICETOBOOK Price to book ratio
Presence of an extraordinary item
EXTRA
AUDCHG
Change in auditor fiom prior year
Busy season audit (Dec or Jan year end)
BUSY
Audit opinion other than clean
OPIN
Presence of a negative net income
NEGNI

-

BUSY

OPIN

1.OOOO
-0.0189
0.0383

1.OOOO
0.0279

NEGNI

1.OOOO

TABLE 5
Distribution of Days to File for Sample Used in the Event Study
SIC
Codes*
10-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
70-79
80-89
90-99

Year
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
200 1
2002

Observations
447
1,325
2,043
610
594
928
259
36
6,242

Minimum Maximum
File Days File Days Percentage
105
38
7.16%
36
166
21.23%
31
158
32.73%
35
9.77%
106
50
9.52%
158
33
14.87%
116
44
138
4.15%
61
0.58%
92

Minimum
Observations File Days
267
39
26 1
39
358
38
446
35
78 1
32
859
35
979
31
1,114
35
1,177
36
6,242

'

I

Maximum
File Days Percentage
165
4.3%
163
4.2%
166
5.7%
166
7.1%
12.5%
166
13.8%
119
15.7%
158
17.8%
106
18.9%
158

* SIC codes 6000-6999 are financial firms and were eliminated from the sample.

TABLE 6
Variable Definitions
DAYSTOFILE The number of days between the company fiscal year end and the annual report is filed on
the SEC EDGAR website.
DACC

The discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the cash flow industry variant of
the modified Jones model.

ABSDACC

The absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated as the residuab &om the cash flow
variant of the modified Jones model.

TIME

The number of days the current year observation varies &om the average calculated by
subtracting the company average 6om the days to file.

LEVERAGE The company's financial leverage (total debt 1 total assets) at the current fiscal year end.
LODIS

Low distressed f m s . A dummy variable with a value of one for firms with an Altman Zscore above 3.0

HIDIS

High distressed firms. A dummy variable with a value of one for firms with an Altrnan Zscore below 1.81.

LNCASH

The log of cash flow from operations.

LNTA

The log of total assets. The proxy variable for size.

PRICETOBOOK The price to book ratio as a proxy for growth firms at the end of the current fiscal year.
EXTRA

A dummy variable with a value of one indicating the presence of an extraordinary item in
the current year.

AUDCHG

A dummy variable with a value of one if the auditor for the current year is different from
the prior year.

BUSY

Audits conducted during the "busy" season. A dummy variable with a value of one for
firms with a December or January year end.

OPIN

A dummy variable with a value of one for f m s with other than clean audit opinion for the
current fiscal year end.

NEGNI

A dummy variable with a value of one for firms with a negative net income in the current
year.

TABLE 7
Hypothesis One Initial Testing - Filing date and DACC
Testing Days to File as the time variable of interest. Testing for a relationship between the DAYSTOFILE
and DACC.
DACC = a, + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE + a3LODISt+ a4HIDISt+ aSLNCASH+ asLNTA +
a7PRICETOBOOK+ E
TIME = a. + alDACC + a2LNTA + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG + a5BUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + a8HIDISt

+E
Absolute Value of DACC
Endogenous Variables
DAYSTOFILE

0.0003
(7.17)

HIDIS

6.6378
(6.27)
-0.0057
(7.45)
0.025 1
(14.31)

Variables for Earnings Management
-0.0028
LEVERAGE
(0.96)
-0.005 1
LODIS
(3.65)
0.0002
LNCASH
(0.37)
PRICETOBOOK
0.0001
(5.10)
Variables for Time to File
EXTRA
AUDCHG
BUSY
OPIN
NEGNI

CONSTANT

F test
F test probability

-.0005
(8.75)

***

DACC
Common Explanatory Variables
LNTA

Signed Value of DACC

***

***

-2.0045
(32.32)
2.6047
(11.80)

-0.5384
(.64)

***

***

***

-0.044 1
(46.73)
-0.0325
(15.08)
-0.0133
(3.73)
-0.0148
(8.58)
-0.0385
(48.38)
0.0001
(2.93)

***

***
0.6650
(2.89)
2.0095
(6.62)
-0.746 1
(4.07)
5.83 15
(1.52)
2.4375
(11.44)

***

***

***

-2.0495
(33.23)
2.6693
(12.09)

***
***

***

***

***
***

0.0593
(10.66)

94.4 142
(2 19.69)

-0.0949
(13.91)

95.0956
(227.66)

80.27
0.000

245.41
0.000

393.11
0.000

240.08
0.000

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully.
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses.

I

***

***

0.6738
(2.93)
2.0209
(6.65)
-0.7478
(4.08)
5.8322
(1.52)
2.5897
(11.67)

***

***

***

***
***

***

TABLE 8
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Company Mean
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defined as the difference between the company mean
days to file and the fm year observation days to file.
DACC = a. + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE+ a,LODISt + a4HIDISt+ asLNCASH + a6LNTA +
a7PRICETOBOOK+E
TIME = a. + alDACC + a2LNTA+ a3EXTRA+ a4AUDCHG + asBUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI +
asHIDISt + E
Absolute Vaiue of DACC
Endogenous Variables
TIME

0.006 1
(2.56)

3720.699
(2.46)

HIDIS

-0.0206
(2.12)
0.0109
(0.29)

Variables for Earnings Management
LEVERAGE
0.0774
(1.43)
LODIS
-0.0121
(1.OO)
LNCASH
-.0068
(0.84)
PRICETOBOOK
0.0001
(2.74)
Variables for Time to File
EXTRA

*
*

***

1.15
.329

NEGNI

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respecthlly.
Variables defmed in table 6. t statistics in parentheses.

**
-72.3598
(1.65)

*
-0.0181
(1.86)
-0.0 185
(0.49)
-0.0942
(1.69)
-0.03 19
(2.68)
-0.03 13
(3.90)
0.0001
(2.02)

23.24
0.000

OPIN

-

-15.2872
(2.09)
-30.6665
(1.99)

-0.1288
(1 32)

BUSY

CONSTANT

*

3.7806
(0.56)
-7.1083
(0.79)
-0.7821
(0.17)
14.8639
(0.17)
-141.1867
(2.44)
-272.90 17
(2.23)

AUDCHG

F test
F test probability

-0.006 1
(2.41)

*

DACC
Common Explanatory Variables
LNTA

Signed Value of DACC

*

-3.6691
(6.15)
-5.5692
(1.05)

***

*
***
***
**

0.0765
(1.O 1)

2.976 1
(0.93)
1.1 170
(0.39)
8.3022
(2.24)
9.3044
(1.11)
-4.5627
(1.05)
29.7093
(15.60)

26.43
0.000

35.45
0.000

**

*

**

TABLE 9
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Company Median
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defined as the difference between the company
median days to file and the fm year observation days to file.
DACC = a. + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE+ a3LODISt+ a4HIDISt + a5LNCASH+ a6SIZE +
a7PRICETOBOOK+E
TIME = a. + alDACC + azsize + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG+ asBUSY + a60PM+ a7NEGNI + a,HIDISt +
E

Absolute Value of DACC
Endogenous Variables
TIME

0.0440
(8.73)

HIDIS

765.4044
(7.55)

-0.0184
(2.65)
-0.0283
(1.70)

Variables for Earnings Management
LEVERAGE
-0.1703
(4.82)
-0.0147
LODIS
(1.31)
.0074
LNCASH
(1.35)
PRICETOBOOK
0.0002
(1.73)
Variables for Time to File
EXTRA

*

-3.3423
(5.71)
-3.5594
(2.16)

***

***

*

7.82
0.000

NEGNI

**

***

11.35
0.000

OPIN

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respecthlly.
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses.

***
-24.1635
(8.08)

***
0.0071
(0.67)
0.0496
(1.96)
0.2440
(4.56)
0.000 1
(0.00)
-0.0495
(5.92)
-0.000 1
(0.65)

-0.1085
(3.2 1)

BUSY

F test
F test probability

***

0.2902
(0.23)
-0.7404
(0.43)
-1.5883
(1.74)
6.9027
(0.39)
-26.97 17
(6.61)
-58.1729
(6.96)

AUDCHG

CONSTANT

-0.0675
(9.08)

***

DACC

Common Explanatory Variables
LNTA

Signed Value of DACC

I

*

-0.5328
(7.29)
1.6756
(5.26)

***

***

0.1640
(3.2 1)
14.54
0.000

29.1 1
0.000

***

***

***

0.1910
(0.65)
0.9530
(2.45)
0.2199
(1.07)
6.0422
(0.94)
0.2676
(0.67)
4.05 13
(8.13)

*

***

***

TABLE 10
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Industry Mean
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defined as the difference between the industry mean
days to file and the firm year observation days to file.
DACC =,-,a + alTIME + azLEVERAGE + a3LODISt+ a,HIDISt + asLNCASH + a6LNTA +
a7PRICETOBOOK+E
TIME = Q + alDACC + azsize + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG+ asBUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + asHIDISt +
E

Absolute Value of DACC
Endogenous Variables
TIME

0.05 14
(5.47)

HIDIS

944.0594
(7.52)

-0.0364
(2.58)
-0.1036
(3.01)

Variables for Earnings Management
-0.2577
LEVERAGE
(3.66)
0.0120
LODIS
(0.56)
0.0308
LNCASH
(2.77)
PRICETOBOOK
0.000 1
(0.4 1)
Variables for Time to File
EXTRA

***

***

9.24
0.000

NEGNI

***

***

4.56
0.000

opin

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully.
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses.

***
-4.0532
(1 .O 1)

***
-0.0070
(0.40)
0.1242
(2.80)
0.2965
(3.29)
0.0064
(0.25)
-0.0756
(5.37)
0.0001
(0.70)

-0.493 1
(4.16)

BUSY

F test
F test probability

***

-3.549 1
(4.84)
-2.76 18
(1 -35)

1.3506
(0.87)
-0.2881
(0.13)
-2.8230
(2.42)
9.0171
(0.37)
-34.6293
(6.83)
-64.0335
(6.16)

AUDCHG

CONSTANT

-0.0626
(4.86)

***

DACC

Common Explanatory Variables
LNTA

Signed Value of DACC

- 1.2984

***

(10.79)
3.495 1
(7.51)

***

0.5689
(3.60)
5.03
0.000

29.19
0.000

***

I

***

***

1.0443
(2.35)
1.7970
(2.98)
-0.4246
(1.20)
7.1698
(2.36)
1.3725
(2.38)
12.7909
(16.38)

**

***

**

***

**
**

TABLE 1 1
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Industry Median
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defined as the difference between the industry median
days to file and the fm year observation days to file.
DACC = a. + alTIME + azLEVERAGE + a3LODESt + a4HIDISt+ aSLNCASH+ a6LNTA +
a7PRICETOBOOK+E
TIME = a. + alDACC + a2size + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG+ aSBUSY+ a60PIN+ a7NEGNI+ asHIDISt +
E

Absolute Value of DACC
Endogenous Variables
TIME

0.0505
(9.00)

HIDIS

637.0776
(8.12)

-0.0467
(5.28)
-0.0344
(2.15)

Variables for Earnings Management
LEVERAGE
-0.2913
(7.03)
LODIS
0.0086
(0.74)
LNCASH
0.0529
(6.40)
PRICETOBOOK
0.0002
(1.48)
Variables for Time to File
EXTRA

**

-1.3519
(2.93)
- 1.7850
(1.33)

***

***

17.49
0.000

NEGNI

-0.5 194
(0.22)

-0.03 14
(2.39)
0.0533
(2.30)
0.4022
(6.68)
0.0098
(0.59)
-0.1143
(9.69)
-0.000 1
(0.33)

12.07
0.000

OPIN

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully.
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses.

***

***

***

-0.1624
(4.09)

BUSY

F test
F test probability

***

0.6257
(0.60)
0.0487
(0.03)
-2.2025
(2.87)
5.9237
(0.39)
-22.0991
(6.95)
-44.3240
(6.84)

AUDCHG

CONSTANT

-0.0727
(8.84)

***

DACC

Common Explanatory Variables
LNTA

Signed Value of DACC

**
**

- 1.9252
(27.28)
2.4200
(8.90)

***

0.2227
(3.79)
14.75
0.000

132.91
0.000

***

***

***

0.4032
(1SO)
1.4555
(4.29)
-0.5696
(2.86)
4.6095
(4.77)
2.4028
(7.02)
7.5259
(16.61)

***

***

***
***

***
***
***

TABLE 12
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Sample Mean
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defined as the difference between the sample mean
days to file and the fm year observation days to file.
DACC =,-,a + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE+ a3LODISt+ a4HIDISt+ aSLNCASH+ a6LNTA +
a,PRICETOBOOK+ E
TIME = uo + alDACC + azsize + a3EXTRA+ a4AUDCHG+ asBUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + asHIDISt +
E

Absolute Value of DACC
Endogenous Variables
TIME

0.0427
(9.93)

HIDIS

670.9204
(8.29)

-0.0407
(5.49)
-0.03 11
(2.28)

Variables for Earnings Management
-0.2749
LEVERAGE
(7.74)
LODIS
-0.0076
(0.77)
0.0499
LNCASH
(7.03)
0.0001
PRICETOBOOK
(1.1 1)
Variables for Time to File
EXTRA

**

***

***

18.62
0.000

NEGNI

-3.6653
(1.52)

-0.024 1
(2.19)
0.0501
(2.50)
0.3864
(7.56)
-0.0335
(2.33)
-0.1 115
(11.05)
0.0000
(0.25)

14.82
0.000

OPrN

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respecl3%lly.
Variables defmed in table 6. t statistics in parentheses.

***

***

***

-0.2971
(6.50)

BUSY

F test
F test probability

***

-1.3713
(2.87)
-1.9414
(1.37)

0.7171
(0.65)
0.043 1
(0.03)
-2.5958
(3.23)
6.4430
(0.40)
-23.1695
(7.05)
-42.2593
(6.3 1)

AUDCHG

CONSTANT

-0.0627
(10.21)

***

DACC

Common Explanatory Variables
LNTA

Signed Value of DACC

**

**

-2.0717
(29.10)
2.51 13
(9.16)

**
***

0.4279
(6.41)
19.58
0.000

153.93
0.000

***

***

***

0.505 1
(1.87)
1.5251
(4.51)
-0.8965
(4.49)
5.1542
(3 39)
2.3429
(6.83)
12.3356
(26.93)

***

***

*
***

***

***

TABLE 13
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Sample Median
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defmed as the difference between the sample median
days to file and the fum year observation days to file.
DACC = a. + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE+ a3LODISt+ a4HIDISt+ a5LNCASH+ a6SIZE +
a7PRICETOBOOK+E
TIME = a. + alDACC + qsize + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG+ a5BUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + a,HIDISt +
E

Absolute Value of DACC
Endogenous Variables
TIME

0.0427
(9.93)

Common Explanatory Variables
LNTA
HIDIS

670.9204
(8.29)

-0.0407
(5.49)
-0.03 11
(2.28)

Variables for Earnings Management
LEVERAGE
-0.2749
(7.74)
LODIS
-0.0076
(0.77)
LNCASH
0.0499
(7.03)
PRICETOBOOK
0.0001
(1.1 1)
Variables for Time to File
EXTRA

**

***

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully.
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses.

-3.6653
(1.52)

-0.024 1
(2.19)
0.0501
(2.50)
0.3864
(7.56)
-0.0335
(2.33)
-0.1 115
(11.05)
0.0000
(0.25)

***

18.62
0.000

NEGNI

***

I

14.82
0.000

OPIN

***

***

-1.3713
(2.87)
-1.9414
(1.37)

-0.1221
(3.78)

BUSY

F test
F test probability

***

0.7171
(0.65)
0.043 1
(0.03)
-2.5958
(3.23)
6.4430
(0.40)
-23.1695
(7.05)
-46.3593
(6.92)

AUDCHG

CONSTANT

-0.0627
(10.21)

***

DACC

1

Signed Value of DACC

**
**

-2.07 17
(29.10)
2.5 113
(9.16)

**
***

0.1708
(3.58)
19.58
0.000

153.93
0.000

***

***

***

0.505 1
(1.87)
1.525 1
(4.51)
-0.8965
(4.49)
5.1542
(3.89)
2.3429
(6.83)
8.2356
(17.98)

***

***

*
***

***
***

TABLE 14
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Five Days Later Than Prior Year
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defined as the difference between the company prior
year filing date plus 5 days and the current fm year observation days to file.
DACC = a. + alTIME + azLEVERAGE+ a3LODISt+ a4HIDISt+ a5LNCASH+ a6LNTA +
a7PRICETOBOOK+E
TIME = a. + alDACC + azsize + a3EXTRA+ a4AUDCHG + a5BUSY+ a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + asHIDISt +
E

Absolute Value of DACC
Endogenous Variables
TIME

0.0521
(6.07)

HIDIS

566.7895
(6.21)

-0.0108
(1.49)
0.0174
(1.08)

Variables for Earnings Management
-0.1013
LEVERAGE
(3.00)
-0.0048
LODIS
(0.39)
0.0177
LNCASH
(2.64)
0.0003
PRICETOBOOK
(1.30)
Variables for Time to File
EXTRA

***

**

***

5.40
0.000

NEGNI

-7.7854
(3.26)

-0.0523
(5.51)
-0.0247
(1.17)
0.1213
(2.75)
-0.029 1
(1.81)
-0.0626
(7.20)
-0.0002
(0.70)

5.79
0.000

opin

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully.
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses.

***

***

***

-0.1 143
(2.59)

BUSY

F test
F test probability

-2.7223
(5.33)
-2.7039
(2.1 1)

0.0713
(0.07)
-0.8845
(0.62)
-1.5691
(2.20)
-7.1217
(0.55)
-18.8293
(5.76)
-40.7699
(5.48)

AUDCHG

CONSTANT

-0.685
(6.12)

***

DACC

Common Explanatory Variables
LNTA

Signed Value of DACC

***

-0.13 10
(1.91)
0.4936
(1.77)

*

*
***

0.1215
(2.07)
9.36
0.000

8.91
0.000

***

*

***

0.1629
(0.59)
1.2304
(3.44)
-0.9789
(4.91)
1.6972
(1.80)
0.1889
(0.53)
4.9896
(10.89)

**

***

***
***

*

TABLE 15
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Five Days Later Than Industry Mean
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defmed as the difference between the indushy mean
days to file plus five days and the firm year observation days to file.
DACC = a. + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE+ a3LODISt+ a4HIDISt+ asLNCASH + a6LNTA +
a7PRICETOBOOK+E
TIME = a, + alDACC + a2size + a3EXTRA+ a4AUDCHG+ a5BUSY+ a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + asHIDISt +
E

Absolute Value of DACC
Endogenous Variables
TIME

0.05 14
(5.47)

HIDIS

944.0594
(7.52)

-0.0364
(2.58)
-0.1036
(3.01)

Variables for Earnings Management
LEVERAGE
-0.2577
(3.66)
LODIS
0.0120
(0.56)
0.0308
LNCASH
(2.77)
PRICETOBOOK
0.0001
(0.41)
Variables for Time to File
EXTRA

***

***

***

9.24
0.000

NEGNI

-4.0532
(1.01)

-0.0070
(0.40)
0.1242
(2.80)
0.2965
(3.29)
0.0064
(0.25)
-0.0756
(5.37)
0.000 1
(0.70)

4.56
0.000

OPIN

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully.
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses.

***

***

***

-0.7501
(4.62)

BUSY

F test
F test probability

***

-3.5491
(4.84)
-2.7618
(1.35)

1.3506
(0.87)
-0.2881
(0.13)
-2.8229
(2.42)
9.0171
(0.37)
-34.6293
(6.83)
-59.0335
(5.68)

AUDCHG

CONSTANT

-0.0626
(4.86)

***

DACC

Common Explanatory Variables
LNTA

Signed Value of DACC

- 1.2984
***

.

(10.79)
3.495 1
(7.51)

***

0.8818
(4.03)
5.03
0.000

29.19
0.000

***

***

***

1.0443
(2.35)
1.7969
(2.98)
-0.4246
(1.20)
7.1698
(2.36)
1.3725
(2.38)
17.7909
(22.78)

**

***

**
***

**
**

TABLE 16
Hypothesis One Testing - Filing Late vs. Five Days Later Than Industry Median
Testing TIME as the time variable of interest. TIME defmed as the difference between the industry median
days to file plus five days and the fm year observation days to file.
DACC = a. + alTIME + a2LEVERAGE+ a3LODISt+ a4HIDISt+ aSLNCASH+ a6LNTA +
a7PRICETOBOOK+E
TIME = a0 + alDACC + azsize + a3EXTRA+ a4AUDCHG + aSBUSY+ a60PIN+ a7NEGNI + asHIDISt +
E

Signed Value of DACC

Absolute Value of DACC
Endogenous Variables
TIME

0.0505
(9.00)

637.0776
(8.12)

DACC

Common Explanatory Variables
LNTA
HIDIS

-0.0467
(5.28)
-0.0344
(2.15)

Variables for Earnings Management
-0.2913
LEVERAGE
(7.03)
LODIS
0.0086
(0.74)
LNCASH
0.0529
(6.40)
PRICETOBOOK
0.0002
(1.48)
Variables for Time to File
EXTRA

**

-1.3519
(2.93)
-1.7850
(1.33)

17.49
0.000

NEGNI

***

I

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respecthlly.
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses.

-0.5 194
(0.22)

-0.03 14
(2.39)
0.0533
(2.30)
0.4022
(6.68)
0.0098
(0.59)
-0.1143
(9.69)
-0.000 1
(0.33)

***

12.07
0.000

OPIN

***

***

***

-0.4147
(6.65)

BUSY

F test
F test probability

***

0.6257
(0.60)
0.0487
(0.03)
-2.2025
(2.87)
5.9237
(0.39)
-22.0991
(6.95)
-39.3240
(6.06)

AUDCHG

CONSTANT

-0.0727
(8.84)

***

**
**

-1.9252
(27.28)
2.4200
(8.90)

***

0.5863
(6.35)
14.75
0.000

132.91
0.000

***

***

***

0.4032
(1 SO)
1.4555
(4.29)
-0.5696
(2.86)
4.6095
(4.77)
2.4028
(7.02)
12.5259
(27.64)

***

***

***
***
***
***

TABLE 17
Hypothesis One Testing - Year Sensitivity Testing
Testing Days to File as the time variable of interest. Dummy variables are included to represent the years included in the sample. The
year 2003 is used as the zero year.
Absolute Value of DACC
Endogenous Variables
DAYSTOFILE

0.0301
(10.84)

HIDIS

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2004
LEVERAGE
LODIS
LNCASH
PRICETOBOOK

-0.0260
(5.18)
-0.0212
(2.20)
-0.2323
(7.78)
-0.2261
(8.81)
-0.211 1
(8.86)
-0.1971
(8.69)
-0.2147
(8.99)
-0.2275
(9.27)
-0.2041
(8.64)
-0.1769
(8.26)
-0.1606
(8.16)
0.0887
(3.88)
-0.167 1
(7.47)
-0.0005
(0.07)
0.0339
(7.22)
0.0001
(1.59)

EXTRA
AUDCHG
BUSY

OPM
NEGNI
CONSTANT

-2.500
(10.48)

-.0511
(11.37)

***

DACC
LNTA

Signed Value of DACC

***
**
***
***
***
***
***

***
***
***
***

***

471.3765
(7.77)
0.3454
(0.99)
-0.4927
(0.49)
-1.1354
(0.54)
8.6839
(8.04)
5.7562
(5.28)
2.2690
(1.82)
2.7947
(2.28)
5.0955
(4.64)
-0.3967
(0.26)
0.8089
(0.62)
3.6626
(3.29)
-1.7663
(0.96)

***

***
***
*
**

***

***

***

***
***
0.781 1
(0.98)
0.3074
(0.27)
-1.9886
(3.43)
5.9132
(0.52)
-15.2568
(6.18)
54.1881
(1 1.75)

***

-0.0092
(1.08)
0.0446
(2.75)
0.3719
(7.61)
0.3737
(8.90)
0.3570
(9.15)
0.3466
(9.34)
0.3761
(9.65)
0.3929
(9.82)
0.3954
(10.25)
0.3346
(9.53)
0.28 19
(8.68)
-0.1608
(4.20)
0.2622
(7.23)
-0.0241
(2.10)
-0.0955
(12.51)
0.0000
(0.11)

***

***
4.2370
(10.95)

***
***

***

***
***
***
***

***
***

***
***

-0.7653
(0.33)
-1.9973
(28.50)
2.3962
(8.88)
8.9220
(14.57)
7.7689
(15.57)
7.3838
(17.54)
7.2114
(18.71)
7.6944
(20.57)
8.1413
(21.95)
7.7374
(19.76)
6.2893
(16.15)
5.0158
(12.02)
-3.4766
(4.93)

***

***
***
***

***
***
***
***
***

***
***
***

***

**
***
0.6139
(2.35)
1.8715
(5.48)
-1.0127
(5.15)
4.5427
(2.97)
2.9648
(8.75)
88.4833
(162.88)

**
***
***

***

***

TABLE 18
Hypothesis One Testing - Post 2000 Sensitivity Testing
Test using days to file as the time variable of interest. The sample is segregated into fum year prior to
200 1 and fm years subsequent to 2000.
DACC = a. + alTIME + a,LEVERAGE + a3LODISt + a4HIDISt+ asLNCASH + a6LNTA +
a7PRICETOBOOK+E
TIME = a. + alDACC + azLNTA + a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG+ a5BUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI +
anHIDISt + E
Absolute Value of DACC, years
Absolute Value of DACC, years 200 1
- 2004
1994 - 2000
Endogenous Variables
0.0462
DAYSTOFILE
0.0 167
(7.39) ***
(9.07) ***
DACC
323.6 134
943.4004
(5.52) ***
(6.37) ***
Common Explanatory Variables
LNTA
HIDIS
Variables for Earnings Management
LEVERAGE

~ LODIS

LNCASH
PRICETOBOOK

-0.0283
(3.27)
-0.0489
(2.55)
-0.1984
(5.46)
-0.0 172
(1.36)
0.0486
(5.34)
0.0002
(1.12)

Variables for Time to File
EXTRA

-0.1377
(5.20)
-0.0139
(1.86)
0.0213
(4.67)
0.0001
(1.13)

***

8.48
0.000

19.33
0.000

OPIN
NEGNI

-0.0229
(4.36)
0.0000
(0.00)

***

-4.1 123
(7.2 1)

BUSY

F test
F test probability

**

0.4149
(0.56)
-0.1549
(0.14)
-1.1573
(2.15)
24.1433
(3.02)
-12.4550
(4.34)
66.2247
(13.08)

AUDCHG

CONSTANT

***

0.1462
(0.40)
0.8 107
(0.95)

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully.
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses.

***

1.1236
(1.37)
-6.8329
(2.07)

***
*

***

-1.4862
(8.59)

2.3631
(0.99)
2.0021
(0.66)
-3.9406
(2.20)
-38.5664
(4.05)
-24.1417
(5.14)
27.8060
(2.5 1)

12.76
0.000

8.85
0.000

**

***

***

**

*

***
***

TABLE 19
Hypothesis Two Testing
Logit test using a dummy variable of firms filing subsequent to 93 days after the fum year end. Firms
filing subsequent to the 93 days are given a value of one for the dependent dummy variable.
LATEFILE = a, + alDACC + a2LNTA+ a3EXTRA + a4AUDCHG+ asBUSY + a60PIN+ a7NEGNI +
asHIDISt + E
Logit Test of Late Filers

ABSDACC
LNTA
EXTRA
AUDCHG
BUSY
OPIN
NEGNI
HIDIS

Absolute Value
of DACC
1.6255
(5.05) ***
-0.5274
(13.91) ***
0.2979
(3.13) ***
0.6 173
(5.69) ***
-0.4549
(5.62) ***
dropped
1.4518
(15.82)
1.1026
(12.77)

***
***

Signed Value of
DACC
-1.0882
(3.72) ***
-0.5363
(14.18) ***
0.3061
(3.22) ***
0.6170
(5.69) ***
-0.4539
(5.61) ***
dropped
1.4035
(14.73)
1.1 140
(12.90)

***
***

CONSTAN
-1.0653

-0.88220

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully.
Variables defined in table 6. t statistics in parentheses.

TABLE 20
Hypothesis Three Testing
Results of testing for a relationship between market reaction and DACC. Testing hypothesis three using
CARS based upon -181 to -1 days prior to the earnings announcement date.
CAR, = a. + alDACC + a2TA + a3UNEXP+ E
Unexpected Discretionary
Accruals

Discretionary Accruals
Absolute Value
of DACC
ABSDACC

11.3341
(0.52)

UNEXP
CONSTANT

Adj R2

0.7679
(1.80)
0.0181
(1 .OO)
-4.1774
(1.28)

Absolute
Value of
DACC

Signed Value
of DACC

15.6389
(0.66)

DACC
LNTASS

Signed Value of
DACC

.

*

-1 1.0725
(0.52)
0.7666
(1.80)
0.0181
(1 .OO)
-4.1473
(1 -28)

0.0003

0.0003

*

0.5388
(1.1 1)
0.0099
(0.45)
- 1.9536
(0.57)

-16.1891
(0.67)
0.5395
(1.11)
0.0099
(0.45)
-1.9551
(0.57)

0.0002

0.0002

Absdacc

The absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the cash
flow variant of the modified Jones model.

Dacc

The discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the cash flow variant of the
modified Jones model.

Lntass

The log of total assets. The proxy variable for size.

Unexp

Earnings surprise proxied by the difference between the prior year earnings per share and
the current year earnings per share.

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05,

and 0.01 level respectfully. t statistics in parentheses.

TABLE 2 1
Hypothesis Three Testing
Results of testing for a relationship between market reaction and DACC. Testing hypothesis three using
CARS based upon - 181 to - 10 days prior to the earnings announcement date.
CAR, = a, + alDACC + a2TA + a3UNEXP + E
Unexpected Discretionary
Accruals

Discretionary Accruals

ABSDACC

Absolute Value
of DACC
6.8607
(0.06)

DACC
LNTASS
UNEXP
CONSTANT

Adj R2

3.3779
(2.13)
0.1670
(0.34)
-18.4884
(1.24)
0.0022

**

Signed Value of
DACC

-6.8607
(0.06)
3.3779
(2.13)
0.1670
(0.34)
-18.4884
(1.24)
0.0022.

**

Absolute
Value of
DACC
0.8814
(2.59) ***

Signed Value
of DACC

-0.0025
(0.39)
0.0006
(0.23)
0.0200
(0.4 1)

-0.7332
(2.37)
-0.0039
(0.6 1)
0.0006
(0.25)
0.03 12
(0.65)

0.0 188

0.0174

**

Absdacc

The absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals fiom the cash
flow variant of the modified Jones model.

Dacc

The discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals fiom the cash flow variant of the
modified Jones model.

Lntass

The log of total assets. The proxy variable for size.

Unexp

Earnings surprise proxied by the difference between the prior year earnings per share and
the current year earnings per share.

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. t statistics in parentheses.

TABLE 22
Hypothesis Three Sensitivity Testing
Testing hypothesis three using CARS based upon -1 8 1 to - 1 days prior to the earnings announcement date.
Testing only the extreme abnormal accruals, the top and bottom deciles of abnormal accruals.
CAR, = a. + alDACC + a2TA + a3UNEXP + E

ABSDACC
LNTASS
UNEXP
CONSTAN
T

Adj R2

Absolute
Value of
DACC
-0212
1.77
.2893
.29
-.0098
(0.64)
-7.3282
(1.65)
0.0032

ABSDACC

The absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the cash
flow variant of the modified Jones model.

LNTASS

The log of total assets. The proxy variable for size.

UNEXP

Earnings surprise proxied by the difference between the pi-ior year earnings per share and
the current year earnings per share.

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. t statistics in parentheses.

TABLE 23
Hypothesis Four Testing
Testing hypothesis four, market reaction to abnormal accruals for firms filing subsequent to 93 days later
than the f i year end.

Unexpected Discretionary
Accruals

Discretionary Accruals

ABSDACC

Absolute Value
of DACC
508.1747
(1.34)

DACC
LNTASS
UNEXP
CONSTANT

Adj R2

14.1839
(1.75)
-0.0442
(0.05)
- 109.574 1
(1.90)
0.0197

*

Signed Value of
DACC

-468.4083
(1.30)
14.2147
(1.75)
-0.0809
(0.09)
-106.7627
(1.87)
0.0186

*

Absolute
Value of
DACC
-61 1.3128
(1.05)

20.3 126
(1.72)
0.5329
(0.22)
-111.9359
(1.49)
0.0052

Signed Value
of DACC

*

665.0149
(1.09)
20.6643
(1.75)
0.7244
(0.29)
- 113.9690
(1.51)

*

0.0067

ABSDACC

The absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals fiom the cash
flow variant of the modified Jones model.

DACC

The discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the cash flow variant of the
modified Jones model.

LNTA

The log of total assets. The proxy variable for size.

UNEXP

Earnings surprise proxied by the difference between the prior year earnings per share and
the current year earnings per share.

*, **, *** Significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectfully. t statistics in parentheses.

